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17.01 INTRODUCTION 
 As proponents of a single Canadian securities regulator often point out, 
Canada is the only industrialized country in the world without a national 
securities regulator.4 Creating a national regulator, however, involves 
challenging issues concerning federalism and regional diversity. It would 
be far from a straightforward undertaking.  
 Serious calls for a national securities system in Canada in the modern 
era began with the Porter Report (1964) and the Kimber Report (1965).5 
The topic’s popularity ebbs and flows, with proposals in 1979, 1994-97, 
2002, 2003, 2005, and 2008 to the present. The most recent round of the 
debate has been gaining momentum since 2001. The Harris White Paper, 
published in 2002, noted that Canada had until that point lacked a major 
exogenous event to stimulate reform.6 Following the onset of the GFC in 
2008, Canada may have moved further down the road to establishing a 
single securities regulator than it has yet, though that outcome has not been 
reached and, indeed, may be more elusive than ever. 
 The federal government has pursued the goal of a national securities 
regulator for many years, with increased recent intensity.7 In 2008, the 
federally-constituted Hockin Panel recommended that Canada create a 
single, comprehensive national securities regulator. This led the federal 
government to establish the Canadian Securities Transitional Office 
(CSTO), which drafted legislation — a “Canadian Securities Act” — that 
would establish a Canadian securities regulator.8 In 2010, the federal 
 __________  
4  See, e.g., Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity: Economic 
Action Plan 2013 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2013) 
at 143 [Budget 2013]. 
5 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1964) [Porter Report]; Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities 
Legislation in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1965) [Kimber Report]. For another 
early proposal, see J. Alex Langford & David L. Johnston, “The Case for a National 
Securities Commission” (1968) U. Toronto Com. J. 21 describing the “CANSEC” 
initiative and “CANSEC”, November 1967 O.S.C.B. 61 at 65.  
6  A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 5. 
7  The terminology in this chapter distinguishes between a “single” or “common” 
securities regulator, which could be the product of a cooperative agreement among all 
provinces, all territories and the federal government participating (a single regulator) 
or among only some of the provinces and territories with the federal government 
(a common regulator), and a “national” securities regulator, which would be something 
created under exclusive federal jurisdiction. As discussed below, the prospect of 
a national securities regulator has largely been eliminated since the SCC’s 2011  
decision.  
8  See Minister of Finance, “Proposed Canadian Securities Act”, online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca 
/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-eng.htm>. 
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government referred the draft Proposed Canadian Securities Act (the 
Proposed Act) to the SCC for an advisory opinion on its constitutionality. 
In December 2011, the SCC held in Reference re Securities Act9 that the 
Proposed Act was unconstitutional.  
 Following the Reference, the debate over a national approach to 
securities regulation has switched from a jurisprudential debate to a 
policy debate. Some of the larger jurisprudential questions have been 
resolved, while others have emerged. The question now is not whether 
Canada ought to have a unified, national securities regulator operating 
pursuant to exclusive federal jurisdiction — something that now seems 
unattainable — but what the best arrangement between federal and 
provincial levels of government might be, given their shared 
jurisdiction over important aspects of securities market regulation.10 
The federal government is now trying to establish a “Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulator”, with Ontario, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick agreeing to participate in the 
initiative.11 Other provinces, particularly Québec, remain firmly 
opposed to any such arrangement.12 
 This chapter starts with a review of the history of this debate, which 
adds important context to the current situation. We then review the most 
recent attempt to create a national securities regulator and the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC)’s decision that the Proposed Act is 
unconstitutional. Finally, we consider the path forward following the 
Reference and analyze the various options for change.  
 __________  
9 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 (S.C.C.) [Reference]. 
10 For a comprehensive discussion of the Reference and the potential options moving forward, 
see Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012). In this chapter, for convenience only, we use the term “prov-
inces” to refer to both provinces and territories. 
11  See 17.05 Options after the Reference, A. A Cooperatively Established Common Regulator 
— CCMR as an Example. 
12  Alberta, also historically and typically opposed, recently proposed a national regulator for 
serious enforcement matters, with an accompanying national systemic risk body. Richard 
Blackwell, “Ottawa presses ahead despite Alberta’s new securities regulation plan”, The 
Globe and Mail, April 3, 2014. 
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17.02 OUTLINE OF VARIOUS NATIONAL SECURITIES 
SYSTEM OR REFORM INITIATIVES 
A.  Introduction 
  The result of the Reference — the most recent attempt at creating a 
federally-empowered national securities regulator — has forced 
proponents of a national system to consider different options, particularly 
options based on cooperative federalism. This makes it more important 
than ever to look to past proposals on the issue — along with the 
extensive thoughtful commentary that accompanied some of them — with 
a view to whether aspects of such proposals could be implemented in the 
current jurisprudential and political environments. This section reviews 
these proposals for reform, up to and including the most recent proposal.  
  The past initiatives, and the present ones, must grapple with a 
similar set of challenges and questions. Securities regulation historically 
has been held to fall under provincial constitutional jurisdiction.13 
Proposals for a single securities regulator must deal with the 
jurisprudential and practical legacies of the federal/provincial division of 
powers in this field, as well as the political and social context that gives 
rise to federalism concerns in the first place. In securities regulation, the 
challenges for any initiative cluster around three main questions:  
1. Legal Aspects – jurisdiction, delegation and empowerment: What is 
the scope of a single or common regulator’s jurisdiction and, 
constitutionally, where does it come from? How is a regulator 
empowered to exercise that jurisdiction? If the power is delegated, 
what is the mechanism for delegating it? What legal foundations are 
likely to produce a more permanent, stable, constitutionally valid 
regulatory structure? 
2. Administrative structure: How should a single or common 
regulator’s governance be structured? What is the best structure to 
ensure a regulator is able to respond efficiently and effectively to 
new developments in the capital markets? Where would a 
regulator’s head office be, if it has one? How are the costs of a 
regulator covered? What can be done to ensure a regulator operates 
cost-effectively? Should the provinces receive payments in exchange 
for losing any corresponding provincial authority or administration 
over securities regulation? What should be done about the fees that 
provinces historically have earned through their securities 
 __________  
13  See, e.g., Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at paras 43-45 
(S.C.C.). 
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regulators? How should the transition to a single or common 
regulator be orchestrated to minimize disruption? Are there language 
concerns? 
3. Political questions – implementation and legitimacy: How exactly 
should a single or common regulator be structured — with how 
much autonomy or empowerment going to local or regional units, 
and how much centralization? What are the criteria for making that 
decision (presumably factors such as political viability, optimal 
effectiveness in discharging regulatory responsibilities, stability and 
predictability for market participants, and political accountability 
would be relevant)? How can the system gain the advantages of 
efficiency and uniform coverage while also paying heed to regional 
concerns — which include not only protecting local investors, but 
also protecting unique capital markets, local industry, and 
employment? What should be done about provinces that refuse to 
participate (if any)? Should they be permitted to join later, and with 
what consequences? If they do not join, how should their interface 
with the otherwise-single or common regulator be structured? Who 
should be entitled to (or who is likely to be recognized to) speak for 
Canada in international fora such as IOSCO? 
  Familiar regulatory purposes — fostering fair and efficient capital 
markets, protecting investors, and (more recently) managing and 
preventing systemic risk — are also relevant to any proposal. These 
operate in the background of any discussion of proposed changes to the 
securities regulatory structure in Canada. 
B. Porter Commission and Earlier 
  The 1935 Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads made one 
of the first calls for a national approach to securities regulation.14 In 1964, 
the Porter Report also advocated uniform securities regulation. It 
proposed two alternatives — a national agency with federal legislation or 
a uniform Act creating a single agency. That agency would use provincial 
cooperation to oversee the growth, development and efficiency of the 
Canadian securities industry and markets.15 However, “constitutional 
validity” was a concern, as the proposal would likely only add an 
 __________  
14 Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1935) at 41-42. 
The Report called for a “Securities Board”, with the federal government either taking over 
or guiding the system towards uniformity. 
15 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964) at 
348 [Porter Report]. 
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additional regulator to the mix, instead of decreasing overlapping 
regulation.16  
  These reports both concluded the national securities issue warranted 
attention. The Porter Report, in particular, was gravely concerned with 
decreasing duplication, improving enforcement and providing more 
information to investors. It cautioned, however, that a national system not 
become “unduly bureaucratic and costly” or “highly detailed and 
comprehensive” (like the U.S. SEC).17  
C.  CANSEC 
  The OSC presented the CANSEC (Canada Securities Commission) 
proposal in 1967. It proposed that the federal and provincial governments 
jointly delegate their authority to a single agency created by the federal 
government. The federal government and each provincial government 
would delegate securities authority to this agency.18 CANSEC proposed 
three tiers of regulation: a council of ministers with representation from 
each participating jurisdiction; a commission to hear appeals and decide 
important matters; and an administrative staff.19  
  CANSEC would have authority over all interprovincial securities 
matters. Each province would retain intraprovincial control. This would 
 __________  
16 A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmoni-
zation or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 10-11, citing 
J. Alex Langford & David L. Johnston, “The Case for a National Securities Commission” (1968) 
U. Toronto Com. J. 21. The Harris White Paper provides an excellent analysis of harmoniza-
tion and nationalization efforts from the 1964 Porter Report through to the end of the 1990s. 
17 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964) at 
349 [Porter Report]. Some of the pros and cons of a national, common or single Canadian 
securities regulator are discussed in 17.06 Considerations.  
18 This joint agency and delegation approach has been upheld by the SCC as valid in other 
fields. For example, in Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. HB Willis Inc., 
[1952] S.C.J. No. 31, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.), the SCC approved a joint federal-
provincial agency for marketing agricultural products; in Coughlin v. Ontario (Highway 
Transport Board), [1968] S.C.J. No. 38, [1968] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.), the SCC approved a 
similar scheme regulating interprovincial trucking. Harris has noted that delegation can lead 
to accountability problems, as it would be unclear which level of government would be 
accountable for the agency’s performance, and how that accountability would be addressed 
— A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 19: 
There must be a direct mechanism for stakeholders in capital markets regulation —  
issuers and their stakeholders, investors and intermediaries — to express and act demo-
cratically upon their views of the quality of securities regulation in their jurisdiction.  
19 “CANSEC”, November 1967 OSCB 61 at 65 (CANSEC Proposal) and J. Alex Langford & David 
L. Johnston, “The Case for a National Securities Commission” (1968) U. Toronto Com. J. 21. 
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avoid constitutional debates and challenges, while preserving regional 
interests. There would be a head office in Ottawa;20 national or regional 
offices in each of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver; and local offices in 
other regions.  
  CANSEC envisaged a single, uniform filing of prospectuses, ITRs, 
and other materials,21 then: 
[u]ltimately ... that the participating governments could go beyond the 
uniform filing stage and develop a model uniform securities act which all 
participating governments could then enact.22 
  CANSEC had other advantages: the federal government would be 
involved; all provinces need not participate at once; dissatisfied provinces 
could leave at any time;23 and, implementation could be staged.24 As the first 
proposal to grapple seriously with the questions of jurisdiction, administration 
and legitimacy that underlie this area, much of the CANSEC proposal is still 
valid and valuable today. The CANSEC proposal puts forward a cooperative 
federalist model that seeks to avoid constitutional issues, and establishes a 
council of ministers to entrench provincial representation. At the same time, it 
is based on a gradual adoption model — with a model Uniform Securities Act 
being the product of prior agreement, not the catalyst for it — that differs 
from the more recent federal initiatives discussed below.  
D.  The 1979 Proposals25  
  The 1979 Proposals resulted from an extensive federal study of 
securities regulation in Canada.26 The report is in three volumes: a 
 __________  
20 This “head office” would likely be nominal. 
21 J. Alex Langford & David L. Johnston, “The Case for a National Securities Commission” 
(1968) U. Toronto Com. J. 21 at 29. Some of this has materialized in the Passport System, as 
discussed throughout this text. 
22 Ibid. 
23 This flexibility would, of course, be restricted by practical realities, such as having to re-establish a 
provincial Commission with adequate staffing and funding. Harris sees the ability to opt out as a 
disadvantage because it removes stability from the system. Not only would withdrawals weaken 
the system, but also threats of withdrawal could be used as a bargaining tool: A. Douglas Harris, 
White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationaliza-
tion? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) at 17. However, the Crawford Panel, A Blueprint for A New 
Model: A Discussion Paper by the Crawford Panel on A Single Canadian Securities Regulator 
(Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2005) at 11, note 9, did not see this as a practical concern, since 
participants will have an incentive to work within the system instead of moving backwards. 
24 J. Alex Langford & David L. Johnston, “The Case for a National Securities Commission” 
(1968) U. Toronto Com. J. 21 at 30. Different stages could be, for example, clearance, filing 
requirements and registration. 
25 Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposals for a Securities Market Law 
for Canada, 3 vols. (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979) [1979 Proposals]. 
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detailed draft Canada Securities Market Act (1979 Draft Act); a 
commentary (1979 Commentary) on each section of the 1979 Draft Act; 
and a collection of excellent studies.27 The 1979 Draft Act aimed to: 
[F]urther the achievement of the goals enunciated in this section by en-
suring the availability of information relating to investment decisions, by 
protecting investors from fraudulent and deceptive conduct and by ensur-
ing fair competition, all of which can best be accomplished by the crea-
tion of an independent public body to regulate the Canadian securities 
market and securities market actors over which the Parliament of Canada 
has legislative jurisdiction in cooperation with similar provincial and for-
eign public authorities. 
  It was based on the twin ideals of investor protection and market 
efficiency.28 It had no specific implementation plan. Douglas Harris in 
particular thought this was a problematic omission that showed the need 
for any reform proposal to “not rely on significant further negotiations for 
the determination of its scope or implementation” (although he 
acknowledged that details would need to be left for negotiation).29  
  Many of the issues explored in the 1979 Proposals are still relevant. For 
example, the 1979 Commentary noted that the “administration” provisions of 
the 1979 Draft Act were designed to encourage cooperation with provincial 
securities regulators and other government agencies. However, as with 
CANSEC, nothing came of this enormous effort. The national system topic 
virtually disappeared for 15 years. 
E.  1994 to 1997 Proposals 
                                                                                                                        
26 Johnston anticipated that the lack of input from policy makers and the provinces would limit the 
“practical success” of the 1979 Proposals: David L. Johnston, “Book Review of Proposals for a 
Securities Market Law for Canada” (1981) 26 McGill L.J. 626 at 626. Another point noted in 
earlier editions of this treatise was the need for consultation and cooperation, which appears to be 
the direction that current single or common regulator approaches are taking. 
27 The studies were comprehensive, covering topics including: “Canadian Capital Markets”; 
“Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation”; “The Definition of Security for 
Purposes of a Securities Act”; “Disclosure Requirements”; “Continuing Disclosure and Data 
Collection”; “Securities Regulation: Problems in Relation to Sanctions”; “Insider Trading”; 
“Canadian Financial Institutions”; “Applications of Automation in the Canadian Securities 
Industry: Present and Projected”; “International Aspects of Securities Legislation”; “The 
Licensing of Securities Market Actors”; and “Government Supervision of Self-Regulatory 
Organizations in the Canadian Securities Industry”. 
28 See Chapter 1 Context and Philosophy, 1.04 Purpose of Securities Regulation, B. Twin 
Goals: Investor Protection and Efficient Capital Markets. 
29 A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 25.  
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  The national regulator proposal resurfaced in 1994. One immediate 
difficulty was that it countered the trend at the time of devolving power away 
from the federal government.30 Thus, it encountered resistance, especially in 
Québec.31  
1. The 1994 Proposal 
  In 1994, at the request of the premiers of the Atlantic provinces,32 
the federal government developed a draft memorandum of understanding 
concerning a uniform securities regulator. The OSC, another supporter of 
the initiative, published the 1994 Proposal in its Securities Bulletin.33 The 
1994 Proposal was to be between Canada and any participating provinces. 
The federal government clearly contemplated that some provinces (for 
example, Québec) might opt out of a national system. The 1994 Proposal 
would not in any way have affected the jurisdiction of those provinces.  
  The preamble explicitly stated the desire to improve regulatory 
efficiency by decreasing overlap and duplication by establishing “... a 
uniform securities regulatory structure which [would] apply 
comprehensively within and across all participating provinces”.34 It also 
emphasized the need to recognize and foster regional characteristics. 
Finally, it stressed that no participant would lose “... any jurisdiction, right, 
power, privilege, prerogative or immunity by virtue of this agreement or 
any other agreement resulting therefrom”.35  
 __________  
30 However, some say that centralization of securities regulation could be “traded off” for 
decentralization in other areas. For example, see David L. Johnston, Letter to the Honoura-
ble John Manley, January 11, 1996 at 2: 
If the federal government proposes devolution of powers in a certain number of fields 
such as immigration, manpower training, housing, municipal affairs, forestry, fish, agri-
culture, environment, energy, pursuant to the Masse Committee deliberation, it may be 
appropriate to look at two-way street trade-offs in areas such as securities regulation[.] 
 In the February 27, 1996 Throne Speech, 2nd Sess., 35th Parl., online, <http://www.parl. 
gc.ca/Parlinfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/35-2-e.html>, the federal government stated (at 5) 
that it was prepared to withdraw from “labour market training, forestry, mining, and recrea-
tion”, although it did not explicitly mention trade-offs with other fields. 
31 For example, Bloc Québecois MP Yvan Loubier criticized the logic behind a national 
commission. He cited Ottawa’s contrary commitment in the 1996 Throne Speech, ibid., to 
increase provincial responsibilities in certain areas: Rob Carrick, “Ontario Considers Hand-
ing Securities Regulation to Ottawa”, The Globe and Mail (March 5, 1996). 
32 A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 27.  
33 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 4401 [1994 Proposal]. 
34 1994 Proposal, ibid., at 4401. 
35 1994 Proposal, ibid. 
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  The 1994 Proposal contemplated a transition period of one year. 
During the transition, the federal government was to enact comprehensive 
securities legislation36 and establish a Canadian Securities Commission 
(CSC). The federal legislation would not apply to intraprovincial matters 
or to any matters relating to non-participating provinces. Canada would 
represent the CSC in international fora.37 During the transition period, 
provinces would repeal their existing legislation, incorporate as their own 
the new federal legislation (by reference, as it would exist from time to 
time), and delegate administrative authority over their legislation to the 
CSC.  
  The CSC, headquartered in Toronto, would be autonomous and 
report to the federal Minister of Finance. Regional offices in each of British 
Columbia, Alberta, and one of the Atlantic provinces (and others, if that 
would increase efficiency) would preserve regional flexibility and 
service. Other regions could have had local representation.38  
  The system would be “closed”.39 Participating provinces could exempt 
offerings from the federal legislative provisions if they met certain closed 
conditions.40 As compensation for lost future revenues, Canada would pay an 
aggregate lump sum of $150 million to all participating provinces. That 
amount would be recovered from future CSC-generated revenues.41 Fees paid 
to the CSC would be for the CSC (that is, not funnelled into general 
revenue).42  
 __________  
36 This legislation (the Act, regulations and policy statements) was to be similar to “existing 
uniform provincial legislation” (1994 Proposal, ibid., ss. 2-3, at 4402). Presumably, this 
meant the relatively uniform legislation in Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan.  
37 1994 Proposal, ibid., s. 30, at 4407. 
38 1994 Proposal, ibid., s. 23, at 4406. 
39 See Chapter 9 Distribution Exemptions, 9.02 Preliminary Concepts, B. The Closed System. 
40 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 4401, s. 24 at 4406 O.S.C.B. allowed provinces to exempt offerings if the primary 
offering were only to residents of that province; secondary trading were only among resi-
dents of that province; and any secondary trades not restricted to residents of that province were 
subject to the federal legislative provisions. This ensured that the federal legislation did not 
encroach upon matters that were clearly intraprovincial. 
41 This was, and should remain, extremely controversial. In addition, the amounts under 
consideration have escalated in tandem with the growth of securities markets and activities. 
42 Under the current provincial system, Commissions are self-funding. Much of the Commis-
sions’ revenue remains with the Commissions: see Chapter 4 Machinery, 4.05 Financial 
Independence of the Commission, B. Self-Funding. 
642 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
  The CSC would communicate and provide services in both English 
and French.43 Critics were concerned that both English and French 
filings would also be required.44  
2.  Responses to the 1994 Proposal 
  Edward Waitzer, then-Chair of the OSC, analyzed the 1994 
Proposal according to five “key” objectives: (1) maximizing operational 
efficiency; (2) ensuring regulatory integrity; (3) optimizing regulatory 
autonomy; (4) constructing effective coordination; and (5) designing a 
functional transition process.45 His analysis is informed by practical, 
logistical experience in the field of securities regulation in particular. The 
key objectives he sets out remain a useful way to assess the promise of 
any reform to securities regulation.  
  First, Waitzer believed the existing provincially-based system had 
fairly successfully achieved increased operational efficiency and 
decreased regulatory costs. However, there was room to improve further. 
He worried that focusing exclusively on a national system could derail 
attempts to improve the current system.46 Such improvements would be 
necessary if the CSC proposal were derailed or delayed (as indeed 
happened).  
  Second, he stressed that the CSC must emphasize the fundamental 
tenets of securities regulation (investor protection and capital market 
efficiency). Otherwise, competing concerns — such as maintaining public 
confidence by releasing information only when necessary — could weaken 
the resulting regulatory system.47 Waitzer also believed the 1994 Proposal 
 __________  
43 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 4401, s. 36 at 4407 O.S.C.B. 
44 See also 17.06 Considerations, C. Administrative Structure, 8. Language Concerns.  
45 Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 
at 4410-4411. At 4411-4417, Waitzer evaluated each of these objectives in the context of 
the 1994 Proposal. He also emphasized their relevance to all discussions of increased 
cooperation and coordination (even proposals not involving federal regulation or admin-
istration). 
46 Ibid., at 4411-4412.  
47 Ibid., at 4412-4413. Waitzer’s main concern appeared to be that the 1994 Proposal was too 
much a response to pressure from financial institutions. These are federally regulated on 
a prudential (i.e., solvency) basis. See Chapter 1 Context and Philosophy, 1.02 Securi-
ties Regulation and Financial Regulation. Waitzer explained that the objectives of 
investor protection and institutional solvency often conflict. Prudential regulators are more 
concerned with releasing information only when absolutely necessary. They want to prevent a 
potentially unwarranted or premature decrease in public confidence. Conversely, investor 
protection regulators generally believe that information should be released as soon as it is 
available. This provides the public with full knowledge and a level playing field. See Brent 
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was an opportunity to implement more ambitious changes in Canadian 
securities regulation. Such changes were necessary partly because provincial 
legislatures had not adapted to their changing environments.48  
  Third, the CSC would have to be independent (that is, from political 
pressures) and autonomous (that is, self-funding).49 Further, if the new 
proposals merely added another layer of legislation and bureaucracy, 
accountability could decrease.50 Waitzer also believed the fundamental 
principles of the CSC — and specifically, the paramount consideration of the 
interests of investors and issuers — should be developed before political 
considerations dictated the structure under which it would operate:  
[It] appears to respond to vaguely formulated regional concerns by 
prescribing ex ante, in some detail, how (and where) the [CSC] will be 
managed. At best, this is a superficial response. At worst, it suggests a 
level of political (or bureaucratic) intervention in internal management 
issues which would be anathema to the principles of independence and 
accountability....51 
Nick Le Pan, in response, argued that regional concerns should not be 
ignored in developing the proposed structure:  
Regional sensitivity and representation is of serious and paramount concern 
to some of the other provinces ... A truly national regulatory system must not 
neglect such regional characteristics as long as they are not incompatible 
with an efficient and transparent regulatory regime.52  
                                                                                                                        
Sutton, The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the Canadian Financial Sector (Ottawa: Con-
ference Board of Canada, 1994) at 6.  
 Nick Le Pan disagreed (Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 
O.S.C.B. 4396 at 4397. He argued that the provinces were consulted in the development of 
the 1994 Proposal. He also denied that new federal legislation would take an insolvency 
approach. The 1994 Proposal preamble did focus on investor protection. 
48 Waitzer noted that there was a backlog of “securities law issues which should be addressed 
by statutory reform” and suggested that the boundaries between corporate and securities 
laws should be reconsidered. Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, 
in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 at 4413-4414. 
49 Ibid., at 4414-4415. Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 
O.S.C.B. 4396 at 4398, responded that the 1994 Proposal already provided for the CSC to be 
autonomous and independent. This included the power to develop its own amendments. Also, 
it would be self-funding, and employees would not be covered by the Public Service Em-
ployment Act.  
50 Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 
at 4414-4415. Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 
4396 at 4398, did not believe political accountability or responsibility would decrease, as 
the chair of the CSC would report directly to the federal Minister of Finance, who is directly 
responsible to the Canadian Parliament. 
51 Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 
at 4416.  
52 Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4396 at 4399. 
Le Pan was then Assistant Deputy Minister in the federal Department of Finance.  
644 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
  Fourth, regarding coordination, Waitzer found the 1994 Proposal 
more ambitious than CANSEC. The latter did not contemplate immediate 
legislative uniformity among participants. He stressed the need to develop 
coordinating mechanisms before implementing the 1994 Proposal, especially 
if some provinces were likely to opt out.53 Le Pan countered that such 
mechanisms could best be developed once it was known which 
provinces would participate.54  
  Finally, Waitzer was concerned that the 1994 Proposal inadequately 
considered transitional costs, time and procedures. This could be disastrous. 
Proper implementation and transition were vital if a national system proposal 
were to have any chance of success.55 Le Pan agreed it was essential “to 
ensure that any transition [was] handled as smoothly as possible, thus 
minimizing the costs to governments and uncertainty for market 
participants”.56 He noted the importance of maintaining as much 
continuity of staff as possible, and that the 1994 Proposal would have 
established a “task force, composed of full-time securities experts” to 
assist with the transition.57  
  Then-OSC Vice Chair John Geller, on the other hand, favoured 
federal “effective and exclusive [securities] regulation”.58 That is, he 
recommended avoiding a U.S.-style system where the provinces would 
have concurrent regulatory authority. Until such a federal solution was 
practical, he, too, cautioned that the “quest for the best [not] frustrate the 
ability to obtain the merely good”.59 Canada should continue to focus on 
increasing effectiveness and decreasing duplication in the current system.  
  Cally Jordan60 was concerned that the 1994 Proposal was too 
complicated and too political. She questioned the decision to proceed by 
way of Memorandum of Understanding (i.e., “political, closed-door 
government-to-government negotiations”) when dealing with “a domestic 
matter for which we have a legislative and constitutional framework”. 
Second, in her view the over-complicated proposal of “interrelated 
 __________  
53 Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 
at 4416-4417. 
54 Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4396 at 4399. 
We disagree. Coordinating mechanisms should be pursued independently of and concurrently 
with the development of a national system. 
55 Edward J. Waitzer to the Honourable Bob Rae, May 16, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4409 
at 4417. 
56 Nick Le Pan to Edward J. Waitzer, September 9, 1994, in (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 4396 at 4399. 
57  Ibid.  
58 John A. Geller, “Federal Securities Regulation” (Paper delivered at the Securities Forum 
‘95, February 15, 1995) (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 658 at 658 [emphasis added]. 
59 Ibid., at 660. 
60 Cally Jordan, “Canada Needs a National Securities Regulator”, The Financial Post 
(February 24, 1995). 
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harmonized legislation with a provincial to federal delegation of power” 
in the 1994 Proposal, was reminiscent of what she saw as the 
unsuccessful and backward-looking changes being undertaken in 
Australia. Third, she thought the federal government might consider 
asserting jurisdiction over the area and simply drafting legislation. Fourth, 
she believed federal regulation should be implemented in stages, 
beginning with international aspects.61 
3. February 1996 to 1997 
  After an initial flurry of interest and comments, the 1994 Proposal 
appeared to have met the same fate as CANSEC and the 1979 Proposals. 
The principal objections to it ultimately coalesced around concerns about 
the size and allocation of transfer payments to the provinces, and 
Waitzer’s concern that focusing on establishing a national system would 
squander an opportunity to improve the existing regime.62 The 1996 
Throne Speech again revived it, when the federal government expressed 
its willingness to work toward a CSC with any interested provinces.63  
  At the June 1996 first ministers’ conference, the federal and provincial 
governments (excluding British Columbia and Québec)64 endorsed the idea 
of giving securities regulation to a federally-run commission.65 The parties 
expected a formal agreement within a few months, then several months to 
draft the legislation.66 The new CSC and legislation would follow the 1994 
 __________  
61 However, she acknowledged this could cause further duplication, over-regulation and a loss 
of technical regulatory expertise. In Jordan’s view, “better the co-ordinated jumble of 
knowledgeable provincial regulators than one federal regulator of uncertain authority.” Ibid.  
62  A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 33. 
63 February 27, 1996 Throne Speech, 2nd Sess., 35th Parl., online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
Parlinfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/35-2-e.html>. 
64 Then-Premier Glen Clark of British Columbia stated that British Columbia had its own 
market and stock exchange and did not plan to cooperate (Barrie McKenna & Alan Freeman, 
“Eight Premiers Endorse National Securities Commission,” The Globe and Mail (June 22, 
1996)). Then-Premier Lucien Bouchard of Québec emphasized the CSC was proceeding 
despite opposition by the Québec financial community, political parties and people. He 
believed this typified the federal government’s attitude to Québec’s economic and financial 
needs (Alan Toulin, “Eight Premiers Support Idea of National Securities Agency,” The Finan-
cial Post (June 22, 1996)). He also predicted chaos and destructive competition.  
65 Barrie McKenna & Alan Freeman, “Eight Premiers Endorse National Securities Commis-
sion,” The Globe and Mail (June 22, 1996). 
66 Ibid. 
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Proposal.67 However, the 1996 revival faded in 1997, and the reformists’ 
drums did not sound again until 2001.  
F. 2001 to 2006 
1. Introduction 
  Proposals for a national approach to securities regulation resurfaced 
again in the early 2000s. Support for a national commission grew in 
various quarters throughout 2001 and 2002. These years were 
characterized by a sense of urgency among proponents of a single 
securities regulator, and a new recognition of the need to resolve some 
underlying empirical and jurisprudential questions. Competing models 
based on greater provincial coordination, without federal intervention, 
were advanced during the same period. 
  By the end of this period, many of the most significant inefficiencies 
associated with provincial securities regulation had been addressed 
through harmonization and the passport system. At the same time, 
momentum gathered around proposals for a single securities regulator.68 
 __________  
67 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 4401. 
68  Another important contribution to the goal of improving Canadian securities regulation was 
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation, commissioned by the Investment Deal-
ers’ Association (as IIROC then was) in 2005. It issued its report, Canada Steps Up in 2006. 
The Task Force focused on enhancing the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets, 
improving the disclosure-based regime, and reducing regulatory barriers to accessing the 
capital markets. It recommended that “a co-operative national program be established and 
funded by securities regulators, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and law enforcement 
agencies” to establish enforcement priorities and improve enforcement: ibid., Volume 1: Final 
Report at 11. It also engaged in extensive consultation and commissioned five volumes of 
independent research studies on several topics: modernizing disclosure; how investment 
decisions are made; new products and emerging risks, including hedge funds and investment 
“wrappers”; the role of securities regulation in promoting a competitive capital market; char-
acteristics of Canada’s capital markets; the international competitiveness of Canadian stock 
exchanges and capital markets; and enforcement. Some of those research reports have influ-
enced subsequent securities practice, or the single regulator debate: see, e.g., Julia Black, 
“Involving Consumers in Securities Regulation” (proposing that an investors panel be estab-
lished — something the Hockin Panel subsequently recommended, and Ontario has imple-
mented); Peter Cory & Marilyn Pilkington, “Critical Issues in Enforcement” (criticizing 
existing securities enforcement practices, including for being fragmented between provinces); 
and Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the Illustra-
tive Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley“ (discussing the 
nature of Canadian capital markets, including its bifurcation between very large and very 
small issuers across provincial jurisdictions), in Volumes 6, 6 and 4 respectively of the IDA, 
Canada Steps Up (2006).  
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2. Reciprocal Delegation Proposals69 
  Two suggestions have involved reciprocal delegation among the 
provinces, although in slightly different formats. In November 2001, David 
Brown, then-OSC Chair, proposed a “Pan-Canadian Commission”, given his 
conclusion that Canada had “too many regulators. Too many regulatory 
structures. Too much overlap and duplication.”70 He concluded that a model 
uniform statute and decision-making delegated among the provinces (i.e., a 
refinement on what is now essentially the Passport System) could be 
precursors to a single commission.71 Brown envisioned a Pan-Canadian 
Commission created by the provinces (as opposed to the federal body 
contemplated by some other proposals), with each province delegating 
administrative authority to that Pan-Canadian Commission. 
  The same month, an alternative reciprocal delegation proposal 
came from British Columbia’s Joyce Maykut, who concluded that 
federal involvement was constitutionally necessary. However, she stopped 
short of calling for a single national commission, reflecting British 
Columbia’s concerns with maintaining regional flexibility and autonomy.72  
  Neither scheme would be stable, in that opting-out, or threats to opt-
out, could constantly undermine the administrative basis. Moreover, 
accountability would be an issue, as would regional flexibility (unless 
delegation were conditional — again harming stability). Harris also noted 
that Maykut’s proposal could actually increase compliance costs, as 
provincial commissions would likely remain large. 
3. The Harris White Paper 
  A March 2002 symposium led to the Harris White Paper,73 in which 
Douglas Harris set out eight criteria for assessing any reform proposals (while 
noting the difficulty of reducing the myriad considerations at stake to these 
 __________  
69  Much of the detail for this section is taken from the A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: 
A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization?  
(Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) at 55-62 [Harris White Paper]. For a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of delegated approaches, see also 17.06 Considerations. 
70  David Brown, Keynote Address (Dialogue with the OSC, November 20, 2001). See also 
Letter from David A. Brown to Michael Phelps (July 8, 2003) at (2003) 26 O.S.C.B. 5466. 
71 Ibid. 
72  Joyce C. Maykut, “An Alternative Regulatory Model for Canada” (8th Queen’s Annual 
Business Law Symposium, November 16, 2001). Harris noted that leaving the scope of 
delegation to be determined did not meet his determinacy requirement.  
73  A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper].  
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eight, or determining their relative importance).74 Like Waitzer’s 1994 
criteria, many of Harris’s criteria remain helpful in assessing the merits of any 
regulatory reform proposal, including current ones:  
1. Constitutional validity: the regulatory structure proposed should be 
constitutionally valid without the need for a constitutional amendment 
or concessions or waivers from the affected provinces. 
2. Stability: the regulatory structure proposed should have structural 
permanence, and should not permit strategic behaviour by participating 
provinces who might credibly threaten to withdraw if their demands 
on administrative or policy issues are not met. 
3. Local and regional flexibility: the regulatory structure proposed should 
provide some ability for local and regional variation in securities 
legislation and/or administration, at least to the extent consistent with 
satisfying the other criteria. 
4. Universality: the regulatory structure proposed should be designed to 
apply as widely as possible across the country. 
5. Accountability: the regulatory structure proposed should ensure that 
elected representatives are accountable to their constituents for the 
quality of regulation of Canada’s capital markets. 
6. Determinacy: a reform proposal should propose a scheme for 
securities regulation that does not rely on significant further 
negotiations for the determination of its scope or implementation, 
and that defines clearly areas of exclusive regulatory authority. 
7. Responsiveness: the regulatory structure proposed should ensure that 
the regulator with jurisdiction will have the authority and appropriate 
incentives to respond efficiently and effectively to changing economic 
circumstances that affect Canadian capital markets. 
8. Cost effectiveness: the regulatory structure proposed should provide a 
clear opportunity to reduce the costs of regulatory compliance for 
issuers and intermediaries, relative to the status quo.  
It is difficult to reduce the list of evaluative criteria to the eight items 
listed above — there are many other considerations that can and should 
be considered, including avoiding regulatory externalities, maximizing 
Canada’s effectiveness and the representation of the interests of 
Canadian issuers in the international sphere, the transitional costs 
associated with moving to a centralized structure, enforcement, and 
regulatory transparency.75  
 __________  
74 Harris White Paper, ibid., at 49-52.  
75 Harris White Paper, ibid., at 49-50 (the points are renumbered for ease of reading; footnotes 
omitted). As is common in securities law, a balance must be reached. 
  NATIONAL AND COORDINATED APPROACHES TO SECURITIES REGULATION 649 
  A final critical element was the importance of finally quantifying 
some of the suspected costs of the current system, and anticipated 
savings of a reformed system.76  
  Harris observed that “[n]o one participating in the debate suggests 
that the status quo should be maintained.” At the same time, none of the 
reform proposals then being offered satisfied all eight criteria.77 Important 
issues concerning the significance of local and regional interests, the costs 
of regulatory fragmentation, and the benefits of regulatory competition 
remained unresolved, with progress “hampered by a lack of focused and 
comprehensive empirical and theoretical research”.78 The Harris White 
Paper recommended that Canada “establish a joint federal and provincial 
committee to commission, oversee and report on the research and 
consultation necessary to recommend a securities regulatory structure to 
the provincial and federal governments”. It concluded that “[g]overnments 
and stakeholders in the Canadian capital markets cannot afford to defer 
any longer the resolution” of these issues in view of the increasing 
mobility of capital and the need to compete internationally.79  
4. Crawford Report 
  The 2003 Crawford Report, commissioned by Ontario, found “an 
urgent need” for a single regulator in Canada.80 It cited the typical 
problems and concerns, such as obstacles to efficient trans-border activity 
and requirements (both domestically and internationally); inefficiencies 
associated with having 13 current regulators (which vary in status, authority 
and function); failed attempts to address the problems; and the CSA’s 
limitations, despite its accomplishments (that is, each jurisdiction remains 
free to take its own approach; national initiatives are developed and 
implemented slowly; the CSA lacks enforcement powers; the CSA is not 
accountable to anyone; and members of the CSA are raising different 
visions and philosophies).81  
 __________  
76 Harris White Paper, ibid., at 51-52. 
77  Harris White Paper, ibid., at 52. 
78  Harris White Paper, ibid., at 75, 75-86. 
79  Harris White Paper, ibid., at 90. 
80 Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2003) at 29 [Crawford Report]. The draft report was issued in 
2002 and was one of the proposals considered in A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Sympo-
sium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: 
CMI/CFIE, 2002) [Harris White Paper] at 44-45, 54.  
81 Crawford Report, ibid., at 29-36. Regarding the last point, the Crawford Report notes the 
following, at 34: “With no coordinated focus to all these initiatives, the risk is that rather than 
pursuing an ideal system, the country’s system of securities regulation grows ever more 
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  The Crawford Report recommended that a single national regulator 
be established, but with regional offices to reflect regional concerns. 
However, it did not endorse a particular model for its constitution, noting 
that “proposals for a federal regulator could be revived … [a]lternatively, 
a supra-provincial body to which the provinces and territories delegate 
their authority could be established” or other models may be proposed.82 
In the interim, the Crawford Report endorsed continued and increased 
harmonization efforts.83  
  In discussing this recommendation in 2004, the Standing Committee 
on Finance and Economic Affairs found “unanimous” support for a single 
regulator, but no consensus on the method to achieve this goal.84 It 
ultimately recommended continuing work towards a single regulatory 
system, with “one new regulator, one common body of securities law and 
one set of fees.”85  
                                                                                                                        
fragmented and cumbersome”. An example of such different perspectives across Canada is 
the recent proposals for regulating shareholder rights plans (“poison pills”) during takeovers. 
Québec’s proposal (AMF, “Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities 
Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics,” March 14, 2013) diverges in important ways 
from the CSA’s proposed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans. See Chapter 11 Take-
Over Bids, 11.07 Defensive Tactics, I. Shareholders’ Rights Plan (“Poison Pill”), 2. Pro-
posed NI 62-105 Security Holder Rights Plans. 
82  Crawford Report, ibid., at 37. 
83 Crawford Report, ibid., at 41: “Harmonization” consists of regulators agreeing to work 
toward common ends but allowing different regulators to adopt different means. In Canada, 
this would mean each province could have different legislation, so long as the broad effects of 
each were equivalent. That could be achieved, in part, through similar interpretation or 
application and often with coordinated administration across the different Commissions. 
Harmonization differs from “unification”, which means uniform or identical legislation across 
the jurisdictions (though its interpretation or application may vary). For more on harmoniza-
tion see Chapter 20 International Issues, 20.05 Internationalizing Regulation: Methods of 
Interlinking Jurisdictions. 
84 Ontario Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs, Report on the Five Year 
Review of the Securities Act (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2004) at 5 (see also 4-7) 
[SCFEA Report]. 
85 SCFEA Report, Recommendation 2, ibid., at 7 (original emphasis). 
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5. MacKay Recommendations86  
  In October 2002, then-federal Minister of Finance John Manley, 
appointed Saskatchewan lawyer Harold MacKay to recommend a process 
that would determine the optimal securities system for Canada.  
  MacKay echoed the view of the Harris White Paper that the status 
quo was no longer acceptable. He emphasized the need for significant and 
prompt improvements. He made seven recommendations: that (1) a “Wise 
Persons’ Committee” be immediately established to conduct a review of 
the alternatives and make recommendations; (2) there be no more than 
six committee members, who have relevant experience, and who 
should be broadly geographically representative; (3) the committee’s 
mandate “be to identify the appropriate model for securities regulation in 
Canada, including the underlying philosophy of regulation that should be 
adopted” — a system with investor protection, efficient capital markets, equal 
protection across Canada, encouragement of local innovation, and a positive 
image and single voice internationally; (4) the committee consider two 
particular models — improved coordination or a national system; (5) the 
commission have competent and federally funded staff; (6) there be a 
suggested reporting date of September 30, 2003; and (7) participation by 
market participants, academics and regulators be encouraged.  
  The committee was constituted, and a report prepared.  
6. Wise Persons’ Committee (WPC) 
  The WPC Report’s philosophy is well-summarized by the following 
passage:  
The best securities regulatory structure involves a collaborative approach 
on the part of the federal and provincial governments. Both the federal 
government and the provincial governments would have significant roles. 
The federal role reflects the national and international nature of Canada’s 
capital markets. The provinces would play a key role in the selection of 
the Commissioners and have initial and continuing input into the legislation. 
 __________  
86 Material for this section is taken from Harold MacKay, “Letter to the Honourable John 
Manley” November 15, 2002, Department of Finance. See also John Manley, “Letter from 
Minister Manley to Provincial Ministers,” March 4, 2003, Department of Finance; “Head of 
TSX seeks end to Turf Wars — Stymiest Challenges ‘feuding regulators’ to Work Together”, 
The Globe and Mail, November 28, 2002. In December 2002, Finance Minister John Manley 
endorsed MacKay’s recommendation that a “Wise Persons’ Committee” be established. The 
Wise Person’s Committee, It’s Time: Wise Person’s Committee to review the structure of 
securities regulation in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003) [WPC Report] was 
issued in December 2003. 
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This would ensure that Canada retains the accumulated experience of the 
provinces in securities regulation. It would also ensure that the Canadian 
securities regulatory system would continue to be administered in a way 
that is regionally responsive to investors and issuers across Canada. The 
model provides for continued federal-provincial consultation in the evolution 
of Canada’s securities regulatory system.87  
  Under the WPC Report’s proposal,88 the federal government was to 
have enacted a comprehensive Canadian Securities Act. The WPC’s 
proposed Act could only be amended with the agreement of a majority of 
provinces representing a majority of the Canadian population. There 
would be a Canadian Securities Commission (CSC), with commissioners 
from all regions (two from each of Ontario and Québec; one from each of 
British Columbia and Alberta; two from the other jurisdictions; and one 
from any jurisdiction). The federal Minister of Finance would appoint 
commissioners from nominees. Each province (but not the territories) 
would have a representative on the nominating committee. Each 
provincial minister and the federal Minister of Finance would be on a 
Securities Policy Ministerial Committee.  
  The CSC’s head office would be in the National Capital Region. 
The head office would enact rules and policies, set enforcement priorities, 
handle international matters, regulate exchanges and self-regulatory 
organizations, and coordinate the regional offices. There would be “strong, 
functionally empowered regional offices in Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, 
Toronto, Montreal and Halifax”.89 Those would handle prospectus reviews, 
exemption applications, registration applications, compliance reviews and 
investigations. They would also initiate enforcement proceedings, with 
adjudication by a separate body. The CSC would be accountable to the 
public through the federal Minister of Finance.  
 __________  
87 WPC Report, ibid., at 57. 
88 WPC Report, ibid., at 57-69. 
89 WPC Report, ibid., at 58. 
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7. Passport System90 
  While Ontario and the federal government have been most energetic 
in advocating for a single regulator, over the last decade the other 
provinces have also undertaken efforts to change the status quo and 
improve the efficiency of securities regulation. In September 2004, the 
governments from 12 provinces and territories (all but Ontario) entered 
into A Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Securities Regulation (the “Passport MOU”).91 It contained their 
agreement to form a Council of Ministers of Securities Regulation “to 
approve strategies and action plans to enhance the regulatory framework for 
securities through” a number of means, including “implementing the passport 
system and monitoring its operation”.92  
  The Passport System was implemented in September 2005 through 
MI 11-101 Principal Regulator System, and it continues to operate, now 
through MI 11-102 Passport System and related instruments. It focused 
initially on areas of securities laws that were already highly harmonized, 
such as prospectuses, exemptions and continuous disclosure.93 Each 
market participant has a “principal regulator” which completes the 
majority of matters such as reviews and decision-making.94 Today it is a 
 __________  
90 See Chapter 4 Machinery, 4.02 Structure of the Commission, H. The Passport System and 
Chapter 7 The Prospectus, 7.06 Passport System. The Passport System largely superseded 
the Uniform Securities Legislation (USL) project, spearheaded by the ASC (see CSA Notice 
11-303 The Uniform Securities Legislation Project). The USL project had created a consul-
tation draft of a complete code of the core requirements of securities regulation (the Uniform 
Securities Act) — details were to be in the rules (it would have been easier to change the 
rules in all jurisdictions), thus increasing flexibility and maintaining the uniform “platform” 
legislation. This undertaking was, however, derailed — seemingly by practical, political and 
application problems. However, work on the USL project was likely helpful during at least 
the initial stages of developing the Passport System.  
91 Provincial-Territorial Securities Initiative, A Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of 
Understanding Regarding Securities Regulation, September 30, 2004. 
92 Ibid., s. 3.1. 
93 Ibid., ss. 5.2, 5.3. This is similar to the “staging” approach recommended if federal 
legislation were passed without uniform legislation. 
94 MI 11-102 Passport System, s. 1.1 “principal regulator”. The principal regulator model under 
the Passport System is not to be confused with the “regulatory competition” model. Under the 
former, the principal regulator is the jurisdiction with which the market participant has 
the closest connection, but all of the jurisdictions have similar essential requirements (with 
some — typically minor — regional differences). Under the latter, the market participant 
would choose its preferred jurisdiction and, therefore, its preferred regime —– each of those 
regimes would have an incentive to enact “beneficial regulatory requirements” rather 
than “burdensome regulatory requirements”. See E. J. Pan, “Harmonization of U.S.-EU 
Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities Regulator” (2003) 34 Law 
& Pol’y Int’l Bus. 499 at 506. Also see, e.g., Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, 
“The Rationales Underlying Reincorporation and Implications for Canadian Corporations” 
(2002) 22 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 277). We discuss regulatory competition in the context of 
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comprehensive system that covers most aspects of securities regulation.95 
It has also been a catalyst for substantial harmonization across the 
provincial regimes — including in Ontario.  
  The passport system has sought to provide “a single window of 
access to market participants … through mutual recognition, legal 
delegation [delegation of power to a primary jurisdiction], or a 
combination”.96 It operates somewhat like what U.S. lawyers would 
recognize as a “full faith and credit” regime, in which autonomous 
jurisdictions (states in the U.S. context, or provincial securities regulators 
in Canada) agree to recognize and give credit to other autonomous 
jurisdictions’ decisions as if they were their own.  
  Provinces maintain the ability to enact local rules under the Passport 
System (allowing for regional differences and the testing of new 
initiatives). However, they are expected to consider several factors before 
implementing any legislation that would not be “highly harmonized” 
with that of other participating jurisdictions. Those considerations are:  
• Whether the initiative is necessary to meet a policy objective; 
• How the impact on other jurisdictions would be minimized; 
• How the impact on the efficiency of the provincial/territorial 
passport framework would be minimized; 
• Making the measure subject to regular reassessment to ensure the 
integrity of the passport system is maintained.97  
  All jurisdictions also “retain the authority to set and collect fees”.98 
In other words, issuers must pay the requisite regulators’ fees in all 
jurisdictions even though only one jurisdiction is responsible for, for 
example, issuing a receipt for a prospectus.  
  The Passport System was a response to forceful criticisms about 
delay and inefficiency. For at least some provincial participants, 
addressing these problems was a means to defuse increasingly urgent calls 
for national securities regulation. Indeed, under the Passport MOU, the 
signatories effectively precluded further development towards a national 
system:  
                                                                                                                        
deleterious regulatory arbitrage between London and New York in Chapter 20 International 
Issues, 20.02 Internationalization of Markets, C. Consequences, 1. Concerns about Net 
Regulatory Burden. 
95 The regime is described in greater detail in Chapter 4 Machinery, 4.02 Structure of the 
Commission, H. The Passport System. 
96 Provincial-Territorial Securities Initiative, A Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of 
Understanding Regarding Securities Regulation, September 30, 2004, s. 5.1. 
97 Ibid., s. 5.10. 
98 Ibid., s. 5.11. 
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8.2 Ministers, through the Council, will continue to explore options for 
further reform of the securities framework that would respect individual 
provincial and territorial responsibilities for securities regulation.  
8.3 Options for further reform will be consistent with the original goal of the 
provincial/territorial securities initiative: to develop a provincial/territorial 
framework that inspires investor confidence and supports competitiveness, 
innovation and growth through efficient, streamlined and cost-effective 
securities regulation that is simple to use for investors and other market 
participants.99  
  This explains Ontario’s reluctance to participate. Ontario has been 
consistent in advocating for a single regulator system. It has stated that it 
would consider participating in a passport system only “as part of a clear 
transition to a common securities regulator, common securities laws and 
single fee structure”.100  
  The Passport System has achieved considerable success since the 
Passport MOU, in terms of reducing duplication and delay and helping to 
harmonize provincial regimes. Although Ontario is not part of the Passport 
System, there is a sophisticated and effective mechanism in place 
integrating Ontario’s regulatory scheme with the Passport System activities 
of the other provinces. In contrast to the proposals that advocate creating a 
single or national securities regulator, the Passport System emphasizes 
provincial cooperation and autonomy. Any federal jurisdiction over 
aspects of securities regulation — specifically national data collection and 
managing systemic risk, as the SCC ruled in 2011101 — is beyond the 
Passport System’s scope. 
8. Crawford Panel 
  The Government of Ontario commissioned the Crawford Common 
Regulator Discussion Paper in 2005.102 It proceeded on the assumption 
 __________  
99 Ibid., ss. 8.2, 8.3. 
100 Ontario, Ministry of Government Services, Modernizing Securities Regulation in Canada 
(Ontario, Queen’s Printer, 2004), online: <http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/english/mbs/releases/ 
general/june2404-report.html>. Ontario also placed time limits on meeting those goals, such 
as two to four years for agreement to create a common regulator; and one to two years for 
agreement on common legislation and a single fee structure. 
101  See 17.04 The Reference re Securities Act. 
102 The final report was released in 2006: Crawford Panel, Blueprint for A Canadian Securities 
Commission (Ontario: Crawford Panel, 2006) [Crawford Panel]. An earlier draft of the Report 
was also released, and formed the basis of consultations: see Crawford Panel, A Blueprint for 
A New Model: A Discussion Paper by the Crawford Panel on A Single Canadian Securities 
Regulator (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2005).  
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that a common regulator was necessary; its mandate was to propose a 
model for such a regulator. It stated:  
We are sensitive to the concerns of various Canadian jurisdictions that a 
single regulator may be susceptible to domination by one or more large 
provinces or by a federal policy agenda. We are also sensitive to concerns 
that such a regulator may not respond effectively to local issues, adequately 
service small and medium-sized issuers (“SMEs”) or draw upon the regional 
expertise that has developed at certain provincial and territorial securities 
regulators. … Our model seeks to address these concerns while at the 
same time achieving three goals set out in our mandate: a single regulator, a 
single law and a single fee structure.  
… 
In order for any model of a common securities regulator to gain broad 
acceptance in Canada, it is fundamental that the regulator is structured in 
such a way that it cannot be dominated or controlled by any one participating 
jurisdiction. In addition, a Canadian securities regulator must provide 
(i) accountability to all participating jurisdictions, (ii) transparent governance, 
and (iii) regulatory expertise, efficiency and flexibility in the areas of investor 
protection and market efficiency.103  
  The model104 preferred that all 13 jurisdictions plus the federal 
government would be involved in a common securities regulator (the 
Canadian Securities Commission or “CSC”). However, the panel 
recognized that some jurisdictions may initially “opt-out”.105 The ministers 
from each “participating jurisdiction” would sit on a Council of Ministers, 
which would elect directors to the Board of Directors; oversee the 
adjudicative body (the Canadian Securities Tribunal or “CST”); approve 
rules and changes to structural matters; and arrange reviews of the CSC’s 
internal controls and financial reporting. The Board of Directors would be 
responsible for other governance matters. It need not be regionally 
representative, as skills were the primary requirement. There would also 
be a Nominating Committee (one member from each participating 
jurisdiction). This would present to the Council of Ministers nominees for 
the Board and the CST. The number of vice-commissioners would depend 
on the number and identity of participating jurisdictions. 
  The CSC would be governed by a single Act, enacted by one 
participating jurisdiction (i.e., not necessarily Ontario or the federal 
government) and incorporated by reference in the others. The legislation 
would contain a framework of core requirements. The scheme would 
 __________  
103 Crawford Panel, ibid., at 11, 15. 
104 Crawford Panel, ibid., at 16-29. 
105 The panel hoped that such jurisdictions would “opt-in” over time. It also noted that 
participating jurisdictions could later “opt-out”, but thought this would be unlikely once a 
CSC was established (see Crawford Panel, ibid., at 16-17). 
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maximize flexibility by locating details in separate rules made by the 
CSC. Amendments to the legislation (ideally infrequent) would initially 
require approval by the legislatures of two-thirds of the participating 
jurisdictions.106  
  The panel did not recommend a location for the head office, noting 
that it would depend on which jurisdictions initially participated. The head 
office would set policy priorities, oversee policy development, allocate 
CSC resources, and handle international and financial sector coordination. 
Regional offices would also be established. Those could “build upon existing 
areas of expertise and become ‘centers of excellence’ in certain policy 
areas.”107 Either the head office or the regional offices could receive filings 
and applications. Those matters would then be assigned to the CSC staff 
with the appropriate experience.  
  One senior officer would be responsible for all enforcement matters, 
with enforcement staff in each regional office. Moreover:  
Federal government involvement in the CSC will overcome the 
jurisdictional challenges that have plagued some enforcement 
proceedings under Canada’s current system. Enforcement orders will be 
effective across all Participating Jurisdictions, without the necessity for 
holding multiple hearings and issuing multiple orders that slows down 
the current system.108  
  Fees collected by the CSC would fund the CST. Note that the CST 
and its staff would be separate from the CSC. The CST’s adjudicators 
would sit in panels of three to hear allegations of securities law 
contraventions. Adjudicators would travel across the country, or would 
hold hearings by telephone or video-conference. Adjudicators would have 
adjudication experience and “ideally” some securities or financial 
services industry experience. Appeals of CST decisions would be to the 
superior or divisional court in the jurisdiction where the hearing was held. 
The CST would not handle exemption applications.  
  While the Crawford Panel did not generate any immediate policy 
action, several of its recommendations found their way into subsequent 
reform models. In particular, subsequent proposals have included a 
Council of Ministers and a Board of Directors along the lines described by 
the Crawford Panel. 
 __________  
106 The panel contemplated that the participating jurisdictions could decide to change this formula, 
even though such a change could have an impact on the prevention of dominance by one or 
more participating jurisdiction. Crawford Panel, ibid., at 23, note 21. 
107 Crawford Panel, ibid., at 22. 
108 Crawford Panel, ibid., at 27 (footnotes omitted). 
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G. Recent Developments  
1. The Hockin Report  
  Current efforts towards a single national securities regulator were 
influenced heavily by prior initiatives, but garnered sustained attention 
under then-federal Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty.109 In 2008, the 
Minister appointed an Expert Panel on Securities Regulation to provide 
recommendations on improving securities regulation in Canada (the 
Hockin Panel).110 Part of its mandate was to provide advice on how to 
promote and advance an effective and efficient regulatory approach, “with 
a view to creating a Canadian advantage in global markets.”111 Its mandate 
also noted that the Hockin Panel’s recommendations would “be respectful 
of the jurisdictional framework for securities regulation in Canada and 
[would] allow willing participation of provinces and territories.”112  
  The Hockin Panel released its Final Report (the Hockin Report) in 
January 2009, a few months after the GFC bank failures and bailouts of 
Fall 2008. It made several recommendations and released a Draft 
Securities Act (the Hockin Panel Draft Act),113 designed to implement its 
recommendations.  
  The Hockin Report referred to the two standard core objectives of 
securities regulation: protecting investors from unfair, improper or 
fraudulent practices, and fostering fair and efficient capital markets.114 The 
Hockin Report also identified several “guiding principles”, which 
included facilitating the reduction of “systemic risk”. The Hockin Report 
pointed to “recent developments in the global financial system” as having 
demonstrated the need to include reducing systemic risk as a guiding 
principle for securities regulation.115  
 __________  
109 The late Mr. Flaherty resigned and was replaced by Joe Oliver in March 2014: Bill Curry, 
Shawn McCarthy, Steven Chase and Josh Wingrove, “Oliver To Take Over Finance Portfo-
lio from Flaherty”, The Globe and Mail (March 18, 2014). Mr. Flaherty passed away in 
April 2014.  
110 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) [Hock-
in Report].  
111 Hockin Report, ibid., at v.  
112 Hockin Report, ibid.  
113 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Draft Securities Act, s. 11, online: <http://www. 
expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/CAC_SBS_2009-01-07.pdf>.  
114 Ibid., at 30. These would be included in the Draft Act’s “Purposes” section, as they are in 
the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.1.  
115  Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) at 11. 
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  The Hockin Report recommended that a Canadian Securities 
Commission (CSC) be established. It would be a federal crown 
corporation with an independent governance board accountable to the 
federal government, charged with overseeing a single Securities Act for 
Canada.116 The Hockin Report highlighted what the Hockin Panel saw as 
several problems with the current “fragmented” structure: (1) the lack of 
coordination among provincial regulators made it difficult to react quickly 
to capital market events;117 (2) the current system did not reflect the 
increasingly national and international scope of capital markets, thereby 
limiting securities regulators’ ability to reduce systemic risk; and (3) the 
current system misallocated resources and was therefore less efficient and 
effective as compared to a national regulator.118  
  The Hockin Panel’s proposed CSC was designed to fulfil the same 
functions as provincial Commissions (policy making, rule-making, 
investigation and prosecution of regulatory offence)119 with the exception 
of adjudication. Following the Crawford Panel, the Hockin Report 
recommended a bifurcated approach to enforcement, in which the CSC 
would investigate and prosecute alleged violations of securities law, but 
an Independent Adjudicative Tribunal would fulfil most of the 
adjudicative functions previously performed by provincial 
Commissions.120 The Hockin Report also recommended that the exchange-
traded derivatives market be regulated through securities legislation and 
overseen by the CSC.121  
  The Hockin Report anticipated that not all provinces would be 
willing to participate, and therefore recommended that the federal 
Securities Act limit its effect to jurisdictions that voluntarily participated. 
In the event that a “sufficient number of provinces” did not participate, the 
                                                                                                                        
The Hockin Report did not offer a comprehensive definition of systemic risk, noting only 
that “systemic risk has been primarily concerned with clearing and settlement issues, setting 
minimum capital requirements, and limiting the contagion from failing securities dealers”. 
Hockin Report, ibid., at 10. We discuss systemic risk at 17.03 Systemic Risk of this chapter.  
116 Hockin Report, ibid., at 42.  
117 The Hockin Report noted the Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) crisis in Canada as 
illustrative of this failure. See Appendix B, “The ABCP Crisis in Canada: Implications for 
the Regulation of Financial Markets”.  
118 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) at 40. 
There are also strong opposing views, as discussed elsewhere in this treatise.  
119 Hockin Report, ibid., at 42. 
120 Hockin Report, ibid., at 45. The CSC would retain some adjudicative functions, including 
discretionary exemptions and matters relating to contested takeover bids. Courts would 
retain their jurisdiction.  
121 Hockin Report, ibid., at 55-56. The Hockin Report also recommended that the CSC have 
“sufficient policy depth and resources” to regulate over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, 
which it noted had a close connection to the GFC. However, it did not make any specific 
recommendations about regulating OTC derivatives. 
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Hockin Report recommended a controversial “market participant opt-in 
feature”, which would allow market participants not based in a 
participating province to opt-in to the federal scheme, rather than being 
subject to the provincial securities regime in their home province.122 
  A Council of Ministers comprising the federal Minister of Finance 
and ministers designated by each participating province would provide 
policy direction and propose legislative amendments. A Governance 
Board would oversee the CSC’s effectiveness.123 An “Executive 
Management Team” consisting of a Chief Executive Officer, Vice-Chairs, 
an Executive Director, and other members would head the CSC.124 These 
members and members of the Independent Adjudicative Tribunal would 
be nominated by an independent Federal-Provincial Nominating 
Committee, but appointed by the federal Minister of Finance.125 The CSC 
would also be required to consider the views and proposals of two Special 
Independent Tribunals: an Investor Panel and a Small Reporting Issuer 
Panel.126  
  The Hockin Report avoided the contentious issue of choosing a 
location for the CSC’s head office, recommending only that it be located 
“in one of the four largest provinces”.127 It left the final decision to be 
negotiated among the participating provinces. However, the Hockin 
Report did recommend that the CSC have regional offices in all “major 
financial centres” as well as smaller local offices to reflect regional needs 
and niches.128  
  The proposed CSC would be self-funding, as the provincial 
Commissions are now.129 To compensate provinces for lost revenues 
flowing from the elimination of their Commissions, the Hockin Report 
 __________  
122 Hockin Report, ibid., at 60-61. The market opt-in proved to be highly controversial. The 
WPC had asserted that most market participants in most provinces would have preferred to 
operate under a national securities regulatory regime. By raising the possibility that market 
participants could opt into the federal CSC even without the agreement of the provinces in 
which their head offices were located, the Hockin Report led to concerns that provincial 
jurisdictions could be “hollowed out” or forced by market pressure to acquiesce to the re-
gime. Ironically, this could lead to the “race to the bottom” that some national-system pro-
ponents fear would be the result of regulatory competition, i.e., non-participating provinces 
might try to make their regimes more attractive to market participants to discourage them 
from opting-in to the federal scheme. 
123 Hockin Report, ibid., at 44-45. The members of the Governance Board would be independ-
ent of the CSC, with the exception of the Chief Executive Officer, who would be an ex 
officio member.  
124 Hockin Report, ibid., at 43.  
125 Hockin Report, ibid., at 45.  
126 Hockin Report, ibid., at 44.  
127 Hockin Report, ibid., at 43.  
128 Hockin Report, ibid.  
129 Hockin Report, ibid., at 43.  
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proposed that the federal government negotiate direct compensation 
agreements with the provinces.130  
  The Hockin Report also outlined a transition plan for implementing 
the new regime. First, the federal government would create a team to 
oversee negotiations with the provinces, draft a federal Securities Act, and 
plan the establishment of the CSC and Independent Adjudicative 
Tribunal.131 The Hockin Report recommended that this team establish with 
willing provinces a memorandum of understanding addressing transition 
matters.132  
  The Hockin Report had little to say regarding the constitutional 
validity of its proposals. It did, however, conclude by saying that:  
In the event that the transition mechanisms and plans described above 
[do] not lead to the implementation of a single comprehensive national 
securities regime in Canada, we suggest that the federal government 
consider unilateral action to implement such a regime. The advice 
provided by our special advisor on constitutional law… has confirmed 
that the federal government has the constitutional authority to do so. This 
opinion is widely held by constitutional lawyers.133 
  As described below, ultimately the SCC’s decision did not align 
with the Hockin Report’s expectations with respect to the federal 
government’s constitutional authority.  
2. The CSTO and Proposed Canadian Securities Act 
  In response to the Hockin Panel’s recommendations, the federal 
government established the Canadian Securities Transition Office (CSTO) 
in July 2009.134 The CSTO’s mandate was “to assist in the establishment 
of a Canadian securities regulatory authority” through the creation of a 
federal Securities Act.135 Its mandate also included developing a transition 
plan for the implementation of the new regime.136 After British Columbia 
indicated its willingness to consider, at least in principle, the prospect of a 
national securities regulator, the BCSCn’s long-time Chair, Doug 
Hyndman, assumed the CSTO Chair.  
 __________  
130 Hockin Report, ibid., at 43-44. Here, the Hockin Report avoided settling on firm compensa-
tion figures in advance, as the 1994 Proposal had done. 
131 Hockin Report, ibid., at 59. 
132 Hockin Report, ibid.  
133 Hockin Report, ibid., at 62.  
134 Canadian Securities Regulation Regime Transition Office Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 297.  
135 CSTO, Annual Report 2009 – 2010, online: <http://csto-btcvm.ca/CSTO/media/Media 
 Public/Content/CSTO_Annual_Report_009-10.pdf> at 7. 
136 Ibid.  
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  As set out in the Hockin Report, the CSTO was to lead 
interprovincial cooperation throughout the transition. The CSTO 
established an Advisory Committee of Participating Provinces, which at 
the time included 10 of the 13 jurisdictions.137 Québec and Alberta were 
notably absent. The CSTO also struck a legal advisory committee, made 
up of members of the Legal Advisory Committee to the Hockin Panel.138  
  The CSTO delivered a draft statute to the federal government in 
May 2010.139 The stated purposes of the Proposed Canadian Securities 
Act (the Proposed Act) were to: provide investor protection; foster fair, 
efficient and competitive capital markets; and “contribute to the integrity 
and stability of the Canadian financial system.”140 However, as the SCC 
subsequently noted in the Reference, the Proposed Act’s preamble also 
made clear that “its immediate purpose is to create a single Canadian 
securities regulator.”141  
¶  The Proposed Act followed most of the Hockin Panel’s 
recommendations respecting the creation of a national securities regulator. 
Many of these recommendations, in turn, bore the imprint of Ontario’s 
earlier Crawford Panel. The Proposed Act would have created a 
“Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority” (CSRA)142 comprised of a 
Regulatory Division,143 and an independent Canadian Securities 
Tribunal.144 A Board of Directors would oversee the CSRA.145 The CSRA 
would also include a “Regulatory Policy Forum”146 charged with 
developing rules and policy, and an “Investor Advisory Panel”147 to 
represent the interests of investors with respect to all of the CSRA’s 
activities. As recommended by the Hockin Panel and as with existing 
provincial Commissions, the CSRA would be self-funding.148 The 
 __________  
137 Ibid., at 9-10. Participation on the advisory committee was not necessarily equivalent to 
supporting the CSTO project. 
138 Ibid., at 11. 
139 Ibid., at 13. 
140 Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian Securities Act, <www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-
lvm.pdf>, s. 9.  
141 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 29 (S.C.C.).  
142 Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian Securities Act, <www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-
lvm.pdf>, ss. 14-17.  
143 Ibid., ss. 22-25. The Regulatory Division would be headed by a “Chief Regulator” (s. 24).  
144 Ibid., s. 28. This tribunal would be headed by a “Chief Adjudicator” (s. 35).  
145 Ibid., ss. 18-21. The directors would be appointed by the Governor in Council on the 
recommendation of the Minister, having regard to their expertise and the need to achieve 
adequate regional representation.  
146 Ibid., s. 50.  
147 Ibid., s. 51. The Hockin Panel recommended the creation of such a panel. However, the Act 
did not implement the Hockin Panel’s recommendation that the Act create a panel represent-
ing the interests of small issuers.  
148 Ibid., s. 52.  
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Proposed Act did not specify where the CSRA would maintain its head 
office or its regional offices, nor the official language requirements, if 
any, to which the CSRA would be subject.  
  At a substantive level, the Proposed Act was generally consistent 
with provincial securities legislation.149 A significant addition was the 
creation of a framework for regulating exchange-traded derivatives,150 in 
keeping with the Hockin Panel’s recommendations.  
  Although the Proposed Act sought to create a single national 
securities regulator, it applied only within “designated” provinces, 
meaning those that opted into the regime.151 However, certain provisions 
of the Proposed Act were to apply “to the whole of Canada”, including 
certain critical definitions,152 the provisions relating to criminal offences 
and punishment153 and orders for the production of information.154 Neither 
the CSTO nor its Proposed Act adopted the Hockin Panel’s 
recommendations for a “market participant opt-in”.  
17.03 SYSTEMIC RISK 
  Before turning to the Reference and responses to it, it is important to 
address the concept of “systemic risk”. Systemic risk has been an 
increasingly pervasive topic of discussion — generally, since the GFC and 
specifically in the Canadian securities context, since the Reference. 
  In the Reference, the SCC adopted the following definition of 
systemic risks:  
 __________  
149 As noted by the Court in the Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 
at para. 101(S.C.C.), the effect of the substantive provisions was “in essence to duplicate 
legislative schemes enacted by provincial legislators”. This feature of the legislation was 
crucial to the outcome in the Reference.  
150 Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian Securities Act, <www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-
lvm.pdf>, ss. 89-92. Despite the ultimate failure of the Proposed Act following the Refer-
ence, Canada has taken recent steps towards regulating the OTC derivatives market through 
the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. See Chapter 20 International 
Issues, 20.01 Introduction. The federal government also intends to amend the Bank Act “to 
create an explicit regulation-making authority for banks regarding over-the-counter deriva-
tives”. Department of Finance, The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportunities 
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2014) at 130 [Budget 2014].  
151 Ibid., s. 250.  
152 Ibid., ss. 251(a)-(b). These included the definitions of “issuer”, “material change”, “material 
fact”, “misrepresentation”, “related financial instrument”, “security”, “take-over bid” and 
“trade”, as well as the definition of “special relationship” in s. 8.  
153 Ibid., ss. 158-167.  
154 Ibid., ss. 148-152, subject to certain qualifications. 
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Systemic risks have been defined as ‘risks that occasion a “domino 
effect” whereby the risk of default by one market participant will impact 
the ability of others to fulfil their legal obligations, setting off a chain of 
negative economic consequences that pervade an entire financial system’ 
(M. J. Trebilcock, National Securities Regulator Report (2010), 
Reference Record, vol. I, 222, at para. 26). By definition, such risks can 
be evasive of provincial boundaries and usual methods of control. …155  
  The Court suggested, “[w]ithout attempting an exhaustive 
enumeration,” that some of the Proposed Act’s provisions on derivatives, 
short-selling, credit rating, urgent regulations, and data collection and 
sharing seemed to be directed at systemic risk.156  
  A different characterization of systemic risk (in the financial system 
context as a whole) was proposed in April 2009 by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), in concert with the International Monetary Fund and the 
Bank for International Settlements: “the disruption to the flow of financial 
services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial 
system; and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences 
for the real economy”.157 Systemic risk assessments will vary, inter alia, 
across countries, industries, scales (regional, national, or international) 
and time. Therefore, “a high degree of judgment founded in a detailed 
knowledge of the functioning of the financial system will … be required 
in any assessment.”158 IOSCO has noted that “[s]ystemic risk, in the 
context of securities markets is not limited to sudden catastrophic events; 
it may also take the form of a more gradual erosion of market trust.”159 
IOSCO stated a concern that a narrow focus “may interfere with early 
foresight, especially in securities markets where often new trends, 
vulnerabilities and risks are not systemic by nature or from the onset, but 
rather become systemic due to size or a specific confluence of other 
 __________  
155 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 103 (S.C.C.). See 
also Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial 
Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the 
Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 200-205 (describing systemic risk). 
156 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 103 (S.C.C.). The 
provisions of the draft federal Securities Act (Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian 
Securities Act, online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-eng.htm>) the Supreme 
Court identified are ss. 73, 89, 90, 126(1), 109, 224 and 228(4)(c).  
157  Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements, and the 
Secretariat of the Financial Stability Board, “Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of 
Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations,” Report to the G-20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (October 2009) at 5-6. The Financial Stability 
Board was established by the G-20 in April 2009. It includes all G-20 economies as well as 
the European Union. 
158 Ibid., at 7-8. 
159 IOSCO, “Risk Identification and Assessment Methodologies for Securities Regulators” 
(June 2014 at 8 (original emphasis omitted). 
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conditions and circumstances.”160 IOSCO’s systemic risk definition 
recognizes that issue: “[s]ystemic risk refers to the potential that an event, 
action, or series of events or actions will have a widespread adverse effect 
on the financial system and, in consequence, on the economy.”161 
 Systemic risk can be a function of several conditions, but three 
criteria can help identify the systemic importance of an institution, market 
or instrument: “size (the volume of financial services provided by the 
individual component of the financial system), substitutability (the extent 
to which other components of the system can provide the same services in 
the event of a failure), and interconnectedness (linkages with other 
components of the system)”.162 Other important “indicators of 
vulnerability” for institutions in particular (rather than markets or 
instruments, which can also be systemically important) include the degree 
of leverage, liquidity risks and large maturity mismatches between assets, 
and structural complexity.163 
 Some commentators prefer to characterize systemic risk as 
interconnected and complex, rather than linear, as may be suggested by 
the “domino” analogy (although dominoes can of course be set up — and 
fall — in interconnected patterns).164 The interconnected nature and 
multiple relationships in modern capital markets are subject to a range of 
risks that operate in the day-to-day markets. This is true for financial 
institutions, financial markets, and financial instruments.165 For example, 
financial market intermediaries (such as clearing and settlement systems) 
face a range of risks in their daily operations. Those risks include legal, 
credit, liquidity, general business, custody and investment, and operational 
 __________  
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. at 7. 
162 Ibid., at 2 (emphasis in original); 8-11. 
163 Ibid., at 13. 
164 See, e.g., Janis Sarra, “Assuring Independence and Expertise in Financial Services Law: 
Regulatory Oversight in Light of the Supreme Court of Canada Securities Reference Judg-
ment” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Refer-
ence (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 111. More generally see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulat-
“Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87 Wash. L. Rev. 211 (describing 
“system effects” between tightly coupled components of capital markets systems); or  
European Central Bank, Financial Stability Report (June 2010) at 155-160. For a network 
analysis of one component of Canada’s banking system, see Lana Embree and Tom Roberts, 
“Network Analysis and Canada’s Large Value Transfer System”, Bank of Canada Discus-
sion Paper 2009-13 (December 2009). 
165 These categories are adopted by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank 
for International Settlements, and the Secretariat of the Financial Stability Board, “Guidance 
to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations,” Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
(October 2009) at 6-11. 
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risk.166 This makes financial market intermediaries systemically important 
per se. The relevant systemic risks can be mitigated more generally when 
financial market intermediaries are operated safely and efficiently in 
relation to those risks. At the same time, because of their central position 
between multiple counterparties, financial market intermediaries can 
concentrate risks and create interdependencies.167 Their failure to operate 
safely and efficiently with regard to the day-to-day risks of their 
businesses can have systemic implications. In other words, their very 
nature creates a situation in which systemic risk can be the product or the 
consequence of those other risks, once individual or aggregate risks 
achieve a certain level of magnitude. 
 That is only one example. Other financial institutions, financial 
markets and financial instruments may also be deemed “systemically 
important”, depending on the criteria set out above — size, substitutability 
and interconnectedness. Because the nature of the various underlying risk 
factors and their relationships to each other can be complex,168 managing 
systemic risk can be a challenging task beset by significant uncertainty.169  
17.04 THE REFERENCE RE SECURITIES ACT 
A.  Background 
 In May 2010, the federal government referred the Proposed Act to 
the SCC for an advisory opinion as to its constitutional validity.170 Before 
that reference was decided, the Alberta and Québec Courts of Appeal 
(asked by their own governments to consider the Proposed Act) held it 
was unconstitutional – it did not fall within the federal government’s 
 __________  
166  Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
and Technical Committee of IOSCO, “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures” 
(April 2012) at 18-20. 
167 Ibid. 
168  Schwarcz describes three levels of complexity that underlay the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis, which provoked the GFC: “complexity of the assets underlying investment securities 
and of the means of originating those assets”; “complexities of modern investment securi-
ties”; and “complexities of modern financial markets”, including the complex relationships 
between financial institutions. He argues that several distinct kinds of market failure can 
result from these levels of complexity. Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in 
Financial Markets” (2009) 87 Wash. L. Rev. 211 at 216-236. 
169  These complexities cause difficulties when contemplating the potential effectiveness of any 
regulator that attempts to “manage” systemic risk.  
170 Order in Council, P.C. 2010-667.  
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general trade and commerce power.171 The question asked at the SCC was 
whether the Proposed Act was “within the legislative authority of the 
Parliament of Canada.”172 The ultimate issue as phrased by the SCC was 
“whether the [Proposed] Act, viewed in its entirety, addresses a matter of 
genuine national importance and scope going to trade as a whole in a way 
that is distinct and different from provincial concerns.”173 Ontario was the 
only province that intervened on behalf of the Proposed Act. Alberta, 
Québec, Manitoba and New Brunswick intervened in opposition to it. 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan opposed the Proposed Act, but 
adopted a “more nuanced approach to Parliament’s ability to regulate 
securities” — that is, they did not oppose the idea of a national regulator, 
if achieved through federal-provincial cooperation and with respect for the 
division of powers.174  
 The SCC released its decision on December 22, 2011. The Court 
held that the Proposed Act, as drafted, was ultra vires Parliament. As 
elaborated on below, the SCC rejected Canada’s argument that the 
Proposed Act fell within its general trade and commerce powers under s. 
91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.175 The Court held that the entire 
Proposed Act was ultra vires. However, the Court also noted that certain 
aspects of the Proposed Act — “management of systemic risk” and 
“national data collection” — are within Parliament’s constitutional 
jurisdiction, as they are national in scope.176 The Court also stressed the 
need for cooperation with the provinces in securities regulation reform.177  
 The Reference decision made clear that the provinces have 
jurisdiction over day-to-day securities matters, and that the national 
concerns raised “do not justify a wholesale takeover of the regulation of 
the securities industry which is the ultimate consequence of the proposed 
federal legislation.”178 At the same time, by clearly allocating jurisdiction 
over managing systemic risk and national data collection to Parliament, 
 __________  
171 Reference re Securities Act (Can.), [2011] A.J. No. 228, 2011 ABCA 77 (Alta. C.A.); 
Québec (Procureure générale) v. Canada (Procureure générale), [2011] Q.J. No. 2940, 
2011 QCCA 591 (Que. C.A.) (Dalphond J.A. dissenting). See Reference re Securities Act, 
[2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at paras. 36-39 (S.C.C.).  
172 Order in Council, P.C. 2010-667. 
173 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 124 (S.C.C.). 
174 Reference, ibid., at para. 35. There were also non-provincial intervenors. 
175 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.). 
176 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 117 (S.C.C.). The 
Reference did not say that the Federal Government had a responsibility to engage in either 
of these areas, only that they fall within federal jurisdiction.  
177 Reference, ibid., at para. 133. 
178 Reference, ibid., at para. 128. 
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the decision also made clear that the federal government could have a role 
in some aspects of securities regulation.179  
B.  The Decision  
1. The Relevant Positions  
 Canada’s argument in support of the Proposed Act’s validity rested 
entirely on Parliament’s general power to enact laws regulating trade and 
commerce under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.180 In support of its 
argument, Canada stressed the fundamental changes to Canada’s 
securities market in recent decades, arguing that securities regulation had 
transformed from a provincial matter to a national, even international, 
one.181 Canada argued that this gave Parliament concurrent jurisdiction 
with the provinces over the regulation of securities.182  
 The main contrary argument presented to the SCC was that the 
Proposed Act fell under s. 92(13) property and civil rights powers, so that 
the Proposed Act was “a thinly disguised attempt to regulate a particular 
industry — the securities industry.”183 
2. Pith and Substance 
 The first step in any division of powers analysis is to determine the 
“pith and substance” of the relevant provisions, in this case the Proposed 
Act. This step seeks to identify the “main thrust” of the particular law by 
looking at both its purpose and its effects. As the next step, the reviewer 
classifies the legislation under one of the enumerated heads of power in 
the Constitution Act, 1867 — either provincial or federal.184 The SCC also 
considered the “federalism principle” and the SCC’s movement in recent 
 __________  
179  We discuss systemic risk and national data collection below. 
180 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 32 (S.C.C.). Canada 
did not rely on the separate branch of s. 91(2) — “legislative authority in relation to inter-
provincial and international trade and commerce” (at paras. 32, 47). 
181 Reference, ibid., at para. 33. 
182 Reference, ibid., at para. 4. Canada, rationally, did not dispute the provinces’ jurisdiction 
over securities regulation within their respective borders. As the SCC noted, securities 
regulation has consistently been held to be intra vires the provinces’ property and civil 
rights powers under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Reference, ibid., at paras. 43-44.  
183  Reference, ibid., at para. 34. 
184  Reference, ibid. at para. 65. Note that the “double aspect doctrine” allows for concurrent 
application of federal and provincial jurisdiction on different aspects, but does not create 
concurrent jurisdiction (at para. 66). 
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decades “toward a more flexible view of federalism that accommodates 
overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental cooperation” – 
the “‘dominant tide’ of modern federalism”. The Court noted, however, 
the required respect demanded for division of powers and a constitutional 
balance: “...The ‘dominant tide’ of flexible federalism, however strong its 
pull may be, cannot sweep designated powers out to sea, nor erode the 
constitutional balance inherent in the Canadian federal state.”185  
 After discussing the general branch of the trade and commerce power,186 
the SCC examined the Proposed Act as a whole, based on the requisite test.187 
In so doing, the SCC examined the purpose of the Proposed Act. Before 
discussing the explicit purposes identified in the Proposed Act,188 the SCC 
characterized as equally consistent with both sides of the issue the 
legislation’s “immediate object”, based on the Proposed Act’s Preamble, of 
creating a national securities regulator.189 The SCC then noted that the first of 
the “broader purposes” of the Proposed Act — investor protection — 
historically had been a provincial responsibility.190 On the other hand, the 
purpose of contributing “to the integrity and stability of Canada’s financial 
system” has “a federal aspect.”191 The Court did not specifically link 
jurisdiction over the Proposed Act’s other purpose — fostering fair, efficient 
and competitive capital markets — to either level of government.192 
 The analysis then turned to the effects of the legislation. Here, the SCC 
noted that the direct effect of the Proposed Act, if implemented in the manner 
intended by the federal government,193 would be effectively to displace the 
provincial and territorial securities regulatory regimes — even with “a 
sufficient number of jurisdictions” (rather than all jurisdictions) opting-in.194 
The Court concluded that the effect of the Proposed Act’s provisions was “in 
essence to duplicate legislative schemes enacted by provincial legislators 
exercising their jurisdiction over property and civil rights”.195 The Court 
accepted that some of the provisions were concerned with genuinely national 
issues, such as the provisions relating to controlling systemic risk and to 
national data collection.196 However, the Proposed Act’s effects went well 
 __________  
185  Reference, ibid., at paras. 57, 62. Also see, in general, paras. 54-62. 
186  Reference, ibid., at paras. 68-90. 
187  Reference, ibid., at para. 91 et seq. 
188 Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/ 
drleg-apl/csa-lvm.pdf>, s. 9. 
189 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at paras. 95-96 (S.C.C.).  
190 Reference, ibid., at para. 97. 
191 Reference, ibid. 
192  Reference, ibid., at para. 97. 
193 In other words, if all provinces and territories eventually joined the scheme.  
194 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 99 (S.C.C.). 
195 Reference, ibid., at para. 101.  
196 Reference, ibid., at paras. 102-105.  
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beyond those issues. The Court ultimately concluded that the main thrust of 
the Proposed Act was “to regulate, on an exclusive basis, all aspects of 
securities trading in Canada, including the trades and occupations related to 
securities in each of the provinces.”197 
3. Section 91(2): Trade and Commerce  
 The Court then turned to the issue of whether this pith and substance 
could be characterized as falling under the general trade and commerce 
power of Parliament.198  
 The Court began by contrasting the apparent breadth of the general 
trade and commerce power with its practical essence:  
On its face, [it is] so broad that it has the potential to permit federal 
duplication (and, in cases of conflict, evisceration) of the provincial 
powers over large aspects of property and civil rights and local matters. 
This would upset the constitutional balance envisaged by ss. 91 and 92 
and undermine the federalism principle. To avoid this result, the trade 
and commerce power has been confined to matters that are genuinely 
national in scope and qualitatively distinct from those falling under 
provincial heads of power relating to local matters and property and civil 
rights. The essence of the general trade and commerce power is its 
national focus.199  
 In delineating this scope, the SCC referred to the “fundamental 
underlying constitutional principles”. The Court noted that a federal head 
of power cannot be interpreted to have a scope that would eviscerate a 
provincial legislative competence. Therefore, the general trade and 
commerce power does not have a starting point of “all trade and 
commerce; the power is necessarily circumscribed.” However, it must be 
given a meaningful scope so as not to violate the balance between federal 
and provincial powers.200  
 The SCC determined whether the impugned legislation “addresses a 
matter that is truly national in importance and scope and that transcends 
provincial competence”201 by looking at five (non-exclusive) indicia, as 
 __________  
197 Reference, ibid., at para. 106. 
198  As noted above, Canada’s argument rested only on the general branch of the power to 
regulate trade and commerce, based on the increasingly national nature of the Canadian 
securities market. The Court therefore considered only this head of power. 
199 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 70 (S.C.C.). 
200  Reference, ibid., at paras. 71-74. 
201 Reference, ibid., at para. 107. 
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identified by the Court in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National 
Leasing.202 The Court summarized these in the Reference:  
... (1) Is the law part of a general regulatory scheme?; (2) Is the scheme 
under the oversight of a regulatory agency?; (3) Is the law concerned with 
trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry?; (4) Is the scheme 
of such a nature that the provinces, acting alone or in concert, would be 
constitutionally incapable of enacting it?; (5) Would failure to include 
one or more provinces or localities in the scheme jeopardize its 
successful operation in other parts of the country?203  
 The Court “examin[ed] the legislative scheme through the lens of 
five interrelated inquires to determine whether, viewed in its entirety, it 
addresses a matter of genuine national importance and scope that goes to 
trade as a whole in a way that is distinct from provincial concerns.”204  
 The Court answered the first two factors summarily, as all parties 
agreed that the Proposed Act “would create a federal regulatory scheme 
under the oversight of a regulator.”205  
 With respect to the third factor, the Court agreed that some 
provisions of the Proposed Act — such as those aimed at day-to-day 
conduct of brokers and advisers — “are not obviously related to trade as a 
whole.” However, the Court also accepted that the “preservation of capital 
markets to fuel Canada’s economy and maintain Canada’s financial 
stability” goes beyond a particular industry (the securities industry) to 
engage trade and commerce as a whole within the general trade and 
commerce power.206 However, the Court concluded that the Proposed Act 
went well beyond such matters “into the detailed regulation of all aspects 
of trading in securities, a matter that has long been viewed as 
provincial.”207 After noting the lack of support for Canada’s assertion that 
the securities industry in Canada had transformed to such an extent that 
Parliament had acquired the power to regulate its every aspect, the SCC 
stated: 
... On the basis of the record presented to us, we conclude, as discussed 
below, that the day-to-day regulation of securities within the provinces, 
which represents the main thrust of the [Proposed] Act, remains 
 __________  
202 [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.). The SCC outlined the history of these 
criteria at para. 76 of the Reference. 
203 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 108 (S.C.C.). Also 
see paras. 80-85 re General Motors; and paras. 86-89 re competition law as an example. 
204 Reference,, ibid., at para. 109. 
205 Reference, ibid., at para. 110.  
206 Reference, ibid., at paras. 112-114. 
207  Reference, ibid., at para. 114 (original emphasis). 
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essentially a matter of property and civil rights within the provinces and 
therefore subject to provincial power.208  
 Moreover, even though systemic risk management and national data 
collection “appear to be directly related to the larger national goals …, 
they do not, on the record before us justify a complete takeover of 
provincial regulation.”209  
 Regarding the fourth factor — whether the provinces were 
constitutionally capable of enacting a similar scheme — the SCC found 
that the provinces did indeed have the capacity to enact legislation on 
most of the matters covered by the Proposed Act and “could delegate 
provincial regulatory powers to a single pan-Canadian regulator.”210 
However, the provinces would “always retain the ability to resile from an 
interprovincial scheme and withdraw an initial delegation to a single 
regulator”.211 When that ability is considered in light of the truly national 
goals of the Proposed Act, “there is no assurance that [the provinces] 
could effectively address issues of national systemic risk and competitive 
national capital markets on a sustained basis.”212 Therefore, the provinces 
do lack the requisite constitutional capacity in that regard. The Court 
nevertheless found that the Proposed Act as a whole went well beyond the 
matters of national concern and into the detailed regulation of all 
securities regulation aspects.213  
 The fifth and final factor is whether a province’s absence would 
prevent the scheme’s effective operation. The SCC found that the 
“genuine national goals” of the Proposed Act — that is, managing 
systemic risk and engaging in national data collection — would be 
harmed if not all provinces participated in the scheme. Once again, 
however, the Proposed Act went too far by having as its main thrust the 
day-to-day aspects of securities regulation, so that the absence of one or 
more provinces in that regard would not be a problem. Moreover, the opt-
out feature meant that the Proposed Act, on its face, contemplated that not 
all provinces would need to be involved in the federal government’s 
legislative scheme — thus undermining Canada’s argument on this 
point.214  
4. Conclusion  
 __________  
208 Reference, ibid., at para. 116. 
209  Reference, ibid., at para. 117. 
210  Reference, ibid., at para. 118. 
211  Reference, ibid., at para. 119. 
212 Reference, ibid., at para. 120. 
213 Reference, ibid., at para. 122. 
214 Reference, ibid., at para. 123. 
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 The Court concluded that the Proposed Act did possess some 
genuinely national features, which were perhaps valid on their own but 
could not save the Proposed Act as a whole. This conclusion was 
supported by case law and not altered by a review of the expert evidence 
adduced.215 In the end, “as important as the preservation of capital markets 
and the maintenance of Canada’s financial stability are, they do not justify 
a wholesale takeover of the regulation of the securities industry” as would 
result from passage of the Proposed Act.216 Therefore, the Court answered 
the Reference question in the negative, finding the Proposed Act as a 
whole to be ultra vires Parliament. The SCC noted that “the policy 
question of whether a single national securities scheme is preferable to 
multiple provincial regimes is not one for the courts to decide.” The 
Court’s answer was “dictated solely by the text of the Constitution, 
fundamental constitutional principles and the relevant case law.”217  
 The Court’s decision has engendered considerable scholarly 
commentary on the judgment’s reasoning and possible underlying 
rationales,218 its relationship to Canadian federalism more broadly,219 and 
the options now available to the federal government.220  
17.05 OPTIONS AFTER THE REFERENCE 
 __________  
215  Reference, ibid., at paras. 125-127. 
216 Reference, ibid., at para. 128. 
217  Reference, ibid., at para. 10. The Court’s decision not to factor in policy considerations at 
all has been criticized: see Edward M. Iacobucci, “Competition Policy, Efficacy, and the 
National Securities Reference“ in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities 
Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 49. 
218 See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, “More Questions than Answers: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Decision in the National Securities Reference“; Edward M. Iacobucci, “Competi-
tion Policy, Efficacy, and the National Securities Reference“; David Schneiderman, “Mak-
ing Waves: The Supreme Court of Canada Confronts Stephen Harper’s Brand of 
Federalism” in Anand, ibid., at 37, 49 and 75 respectively.  
219 See, e.g., Vanessa MacDonnell, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2011-2012 
Term” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 51 at 55-70; also Poonam Puri, “Twenty Years of Supreme 
Court Reference Decisions: Putting the Securities Reference Decision in Context”; Lorne 
Sossin, “Can Canadian Federalism Be Relevant?” in Anand, ed., ibid., at 13 and 101 respec-
tively.  
220 See, e.g., John B. Laskin and Darryl C. Patterson, “Moving Forward after the Securities Act 
Reference: The Future of Securities Regulation in Canada” (2012) 1:1 Com. Litig. & Arb. 
Rev. 5; also Janis Sarra, “Assuring Independence and Expertise in Financial Services Law: 
Regulatory Oversight in Light of the Supreme Court of Canada Securities Reference Judg-
ment”; Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial 
Markets”; Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “A National Securities Commission? The Headless Horse-
man Rides Again”; and Stéphane Rousseau, “The Provinces’ Competence over Securities 
Regulation in Canada: Taking Stock of the Supreme Court’s Opinion” in Anand, ed., 
ibid., at 111, 197, 223 and 279 respectively. 
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 Following the Reference, it seems likely that Canada is moving in the 
direction of increased cooperation, with an as-yet-unknown role for the 
federal government. The choice today appears to be primarily along the 
middle ranges of a spectrum of cooperative options, with varying degrees 
of centralization, involving both the federal government and the 
provinces.  
 It is significant that each province already recognizes the same 
fundamental regulatory goals of investor protection and fostering fair and 
efficient capital markets.221 While regulatory regimes differ, there are no 
fundamental barriers of regulatory philosophy or emphasis to a common 
system, increased provincial cooperation, or some combination.222  
 Although the Court found the Proposed Act invalid, three features of 
the Reference suggest that the federal government may still be able to 
pursue a national or common securities regulator (as opposed to 
maintaining the status quo). First, following the SCC’s statement that 
“each level of government has jurisdiction over some aspects of the 
regulation of securities and each can work in collaboration with the other 
to carry out its responsibilities”,223 the federal government, working in 
concert with one or more of the provinces, could create a common 
regulator. As discussed below, Canada, British Columbia, Ontario, New 
Brunswick and Saskatchewan are currently pursuing this possibility. 
Second, the Court made clear that while the Proposed Act as a whole was 
not constitutional, the aspects relating to national concerns were “perhaps 
valid on their own”.224 Therefore, another option open to the federal 
government is to create a new scheme that achieves these ends without 
intruding into the day-to-day aspects of securities regulation — this would 
most likely occur in conjunction with further interprovincial cooperation 
and coordination. Third, because Canada relied only on the general branch 
of the s. 91(2) trade and commerce power, it remains possible (though 
unlikely) that similar legislation could be intra vires Parliament under the 
interprovincial and international trade branch of s. 91(2), or under other 
 __________  
221  See Chapter 1 Context and Philosophy, 1.04 Purpose of Securities Regulation, B. Twin 
Goals: Investor Protection and Efficient Capital Markets. 
222  Another important fact is that Canada’s market is relatively small. Canadian equity markets 
constitute only approximately 3.5 per cent of the world total. In January 2014, the total 
market capitalization of all issuers listed on TSX and TSX-V was approximately  
$2.3 trillion (TMX Group Ltd., Equity Financing Statistics). These statistics are updated  
monthly and available online: TMX Group Ltd., online: <http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/ 
MonthlyFinancingSummary.pdf>. The total market capitalization of all world equity mar-
kets is roughly USD $64 trillion : World Federation of Exchanges, 2013 Market Highlights 
(January 24, 2014), online: <http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/2013_WFE_Market_ 
Highlights.pdf>. 
223  Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 131 (S.C.C.). 
224  Reference, ibid., at para. 125. 
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heads of federal power. Apart from these options, it is also possible that 
the status quo — with continually improved cooperation and coordination 
— may continue. We discuss all four possibilities below. 
A. A Cooperatively Established Common Regulator — 
CCMR as an Example 
 The federal government did not abandon the prospect of creating a 
common (not a national) securities regulator for Canada following the 
Reference decision. In its March 2013 budget the federal government 
stated that its preference was “a common securities regulator established 
cooperatively with provinces and territories”, with the alternative of 
federal legislation to carry out the federal government’s “regulatory 
responsibilities consistent with the decision rendered by the Supreme 
Court of Canada”.225 The government also stated that it would be willing 
to “delegate the administration of its own securities regulation” only if a 
“critical mass” of provinces did the same.226  
 In September 2013, Canada, British Columbia and Ontario entered 
into an Agreement in Principle to establish a Cooperative Capital Markets 
Regulator (CCMR).227 On July 9, 2014, New Brunswick and 
Saskatchewan agreed to join as well, and signed an Amended Agreement 
in Principle.228 The Agreement would lead to a single regulator (if all 
provinces and territories were to participate), with responsibility for 
regulatory, enforcement and adjudicative functions. It would also manage 
systemic risk and represent Canada internationally.229 The CCMR’s 
principal components would be a regulatory division, an independent 
 __________  
225 Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 
2013 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2013) at 142 [Budget 
2013]. The federal government also said that it would extend the CSTO’s mandate to an 
indeterminate date beyond July 12, 2013 (ibid., at 143), although the content of the CSTO’s 
website is currently archived. 
226 Ibid.  
227  Department of Finance, Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative Capital 
Markets Regulatory System (September 19, 2013) [Agreement in Principle]. 
228  Department of Finance, Press Release, “Saskatchewan and New Brunswick Agree to Join 
the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System” (July 9, 2014); Department of Fi-
nance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative Capital Markets 
Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle].  
229 Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 1.1. The Department of Finance and the CSTO 
use both “CMR” and “CCMR” in referring to the proposed new regulator. In the Amended 
Agreement in Principle it is the CMR. To avoid confusion, we use the acronym CCMR, 
even when referring directly to the Amended Agreement in Principle.  
676 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
adjudicative division, and a “regulatory policy forum for consultation on 
policy issues”.230  
 The parties have set deadlines of August 29, 2014 to execute a 
Memorandum of Agreement; December 19, 2014 to publish initial draft 
regulations for comment; and June 30, 2015 for enacting provincial 
legislation (for matters of provincial jurisdiction), and complementary 
federal legislation (for “criminal matters and matters relating to systemic 
risk in national capital markets and national data collection”).231 There 
would be a single regulator and a single set of regulations, under authority 
delegated by each participating government.232 The goal is to 
“operationalize the CCMR” by Fall 2015.233  
 According to the Amended Agreement in Principle:  
The purpose of the Cooperative System would be to regulate capital mar-
kets in a manner that would: 
• foster more efficient and globally competitive capital markets in 
Canada and facilitate the raising of capital from investors across 
Canada and internationally through more integrated markets gov-
erned by innovative, responsive and flexible regulation on the basis 
of national standards reflected in cooperatively-developed regula-
tions consistently applied; 
• provide increased protection for investors through a combination of 
more nationally consistent and active compliance activities, more ef-
fective enforcement against misconduct and improved coordination 
with police and prosecution authorities both within and outside Can-
ada; 
• strengthen Canada’s capacity to identify and manage systemic risk 
on a national basis; and 
• enable Canada, through the single voice of a new cooperative capital 
markets regulator, to play a more empowered and influential role in 
international capital market regulatory initiatives.234 
 Jurisdictionally, the Amended Agreement in Principle states that 
“each of the Participating Jurisdictions is addressing matters within its 
constitutional jurisdiction and is neither surrendering nor impairing any of 
 __________  
230  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 5.1. 
231  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., ss. 6.3, 2. This federal legislation would be 
“platform” legislation containing broad provisions, with the delegation by the federal gov-
ernment to the CCMR of federal authority to make nationally-applicable regulations and 
exercise national emergency powers related to systemic risk in national capital markets and 
national data collection, and to make orders regarding practices giving rise to systemic risk 
in national capital markets. Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., s. 4. 
232  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid.,, s. 2. 
233  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid.,, s. 6.3 
234  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid.,,), s. 1.1.  
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its jurisdiction, with respect to which it remains sovereign”.235 The CCMR 
would include local perspectives and work towards “needed reforms”.236  
 The Amended Agreement in Principle establishes a Council of Ministers, 
consisting of the federal Minister of Finance and the relevant ministers from 
participating provincial and territorial jurisdictions. The Council of Ministers 
would, inter alia, appoint members of the regulator’s board of directors and 
the independent adjudicative tribunal (both based on recommendations from a 
nominating committee); and it would provide policy oversight, propose 
legislative amendments, and approve regulations.237  
 The CCMR’s head office would be in Toronto, with regulatory 
offices in all participating jurisdictions.238 In addition to assisting the 
CCMR with funding until it is established (at which point it will be self-
funding), and reimbursing provincial participating jurisdictions for 
employees seconded to the CCMR for transition purposes, the federal 
government will also “make payments to Participating Jurisdictions that 
will lose net revenue as a result of the transition to the Cooperative 
System on a transparent basis.”239 Participating jurisdictions may also 
request that the CCMR’s board of directors consider making regulations 
to accommodate specific provincial economic development initiatives.240 
 How the CCMR will interact with non-participating provincial or 
territorial jurisdictions is not settled. Clearly, the Amended Agreement in 
Principle contemplates that its federal criminal, data collection and 
systemic risk-regulating aspects will apply beyond the participating 
jurisdictions. The Amended Agreement in Principle states that the CCMR 
“will use its best efforts to negotiate and implement an interface 
 __________  
235  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 1.2. 
236  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 1.3. 
237  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at ss. 2, 3.1. Proposals for voting rights on appoint-
ments, regulation-making and fundamental changes are also set out (ss. 3.2-3.5, 3.7). These 
vary depending on the topic, with fundamental changes having the strictest requirement of 
approval from all “Major Capital Markets Jurisdictions” (meaning “each provincial Participat-
ing Jurisdiction that represents at least 10 percent of the national gross domestic product de-
rived from financial services (i.e., British Columbia and Ontario initially”)) and the federal 
government. Saskatchewan and New Brunswick are not Major Capital Markets Jurisdictions. 
238 Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 5.3. The Chief Regulator would also be located 
in Toronto, with Deputy Chief Regulators in each of Toronto, Vancouver, Saskatchewan 
(this one “representing Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon 
to the extent they are Participating Jurisdictions”, and New Brunswick (this one “represent-
ing New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island to 
the extent they are Participating Jurisdictions”). The Deputy Chief Regulators located in 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick would hold that post for a period of five years after the 
date on which the CCMR commences operations. Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at 
s. 5.4.  
239  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at ss. 2, 6.4. 
240  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 3.4.1. 
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mechanism” with non-participating jurisdictions, such that the “system 
contemplated by [the] Agreement is, effectively, of national 
application”.241  
 The 2014 federal budget reiterated the government’s desire to have 
all provinces and territories participate in the CCMR,242 although only two 
others have since joined. However, Québec has already signaled its 
intention to challenge the federal legislation described in the Agreement in 
Principle (and the subsequent Amended Agreement).243 It is also possible 
that the CCMR initiative will fail entirely, in which case the federal 
government could still choose to exercise its jurisdiction over systemic 
risk and data collection independently (as it has said it would do). Given 
that systemic risk and other kinds of risk that exist in the day-to-day 
operations of the securities markets are closely related, any federal 
regulation of systemic risk in the capital markets that extends to non-
participating jurisdictions may also be subject to challenge. 
 As noted, the CCMR contemplates that the governments of all 
participating jurisdictions would delegate their regulatory authority to a 
single regulator. Each of CANSEC, the 1994 Proposal and the 
Crawford Common Regulator Discussion Paper advocated similar 
approaches, under which a single administrative agency would be created 
and authority delegated to it.244 Such approaches have succeeded in other 
areas of shared jurisdiction, such as with the marketing of agricultural 
products245 and the regulation of interprovincial trucking.246  
 __________  
241  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 6.5. 
242  Department of Finance, The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportunities (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2014) at 129 [Budget 2014]. As noted 
above, the budget also states that the government proposes to amend the Bank Act to create 
an explicit regulation-making authority for banks regarding over-the-counter derivatives. 
This “will facilitate the integration and consolidation of over-the-counter derivatives regula-
tions with the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulator when it becomes operational.” Budget 
2014, ibid., at 130. 
243 Rhéal Séguin, “Quebec to challenge proposed federal securities regulator”, The Globe and 
Mail (December 13, 2013). 
244 It would make no sense for each province to try to pass legislation creating a single 
administrative agency. The Crawford Panel, A Blueprint for A New Model: A Discussion 
Paper by the Crawford Panel on A Single Canadian Securities Regulator (Toronto: Govern-
ment of Ontario, 2005) would have one Participating Jurisdiction pass the initiating legisla-
tion. The Hockin Report would have established a federal crown corporation. The 
Amended Agreement in Principle and associated documents are silent with respect to 
which level of government would establish the CCMR. 
245 See, e.g., Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952]  
S.C.J. No. 31, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.) (approving a joint federal-provincial agency for 
marketing agricultural products); Reference re: Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970 
(Canada), [1978] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (S.C.C.) (upholding legislation for 
production and marketing of eggs cooperatively established between the provinces and the 
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 In Furtney, a criminal case, the SCC held that: 
Parliament may delegate legislative authority to bodies other than provincial 
legislatures, it may incorporate provincial legislation by reference and it 
may limit the reach of its legislation by a condition, namely the existence 
of provincial legislation.247 
 The Furtney case suggests that the federal government could also 
delegate authority to a joint federal-provincial agency; incorporate 
provincial legislation into its own Securities Act; and limit its own 
securities legislation by provincial legislation. The Amended Agreement in 
Principle contemplates doing the first. It does not explicitly suggest that 
either the federal government or any participating provinces or territories 
                                                                                                                        
federal government); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec c. Pelland, [2005] 
S.C.J. No 19, 2005 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) (approving a similar scheme regulating the production 
and marketing of chickens). Other cooperative schemes exist as well: see Ramandeep K. 
Grewal and Edward J. Waitzer, “National Securities Regulation: Centralization and Its 
Discontents” (March 2012) 27 B.F.L.R. 529. 
246 Coughlin v. Ontario (Highway Transport Board), [1968] S.C.J. No. 38, [1968] S.C.R. 569 
(S.C.C.) [Coughlin]. One important aspect of Coughlin is its finding that Parliament may 
incorporate by reference provincial legislation as it may exist from time to time.  
247 R. v. Furtney, [1991] S.C.J. No. 70, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89 at 104-105 (S.C.C.) [Furtney]. 
Furtney was a challenge to the constitutionality and effectiveness of Criminal Code lottery 
provisions. The main focus of the case was the last option described in the quote above —  
i.e., circumstances in which Parliament limits the reach of its legislation due to the existence of 
provincial legislation. Our concern is mainly the first option. The Coughlin case above also 
established that Parliament may incorporate by reference provincial legislation as it may exist 
from time to time. Coughlin. Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968] S.C.J. No. 38, [1968] 
S.C.R. 569 at 582-83 [Coughlin. Inter-delegation is also discussed below: see 17.05 Options 
After the Reference, D. Continued Provincial Cooperation, No Federal Role. 
 See also British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich (c.o.b. Mountainview Acres), [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 35, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895 (S.C.C.). The Milk Board was constituted by the  
British Columbia government. It had authority delegated both from that government and the 
federal government. The SCC upheld the delegation. The appellants challenged a judgment 
ordering them to pay amounts levied by the Milk Board. They argued the Board’s order had 
not specified on its face whether, in making that order, it relied on its delegated power from 
the federal government or from the provincial government. The majority of four justices 
held that if an administrative order were challenged, the body would be required to identify 
and support its jurisdictional basis. While concurring in the result, a minority of three pre-
ferred to address the issue on inter-delegation grounds. Writing for the three, LaForest J. 
said at 908-909 S.C.R. (emphasis added): 
The very point of an administrative inter-delegation scheme … is to ensure that a 
provincial marketing board is possessed of the totality of regulatory power over one 
agricultural product. The very reason such joint federal-provincial schemes are nec-
essary is because no one level of government is constitutionally empowered to regu-
late all aspects of intraprovincial and extraprovincial trade … the administrative 
inter-delegation scheme is a means of allowing Parliament to delegate administra-
tive powers to a body created by the provincial legislature in a manner that avoids 
the rule against legislative inter-delegation … To require an administrative agency 
overseeing and implementing a national marketing scheme to ‘choose’ between its 
federal and provincial authority would defeat the very raison d’être of the scheme. 
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would incorporate the other jurisdictions’ legislation into their own Acts. 
The Reference leaves open the possibility that federal and provincial or 
territorial jurisdiction may be somewhat overlapping. Moreover, each 
jurisdiction must have the ability to carry out activity that is in pith and 
substance within its jurisdiction, and to carry out other activities necessary 
and incidental to being able to exercise its own jurisdiction.  
 At the same time, the power to adopt by reference will only be 
effective if the adopting legislature also has jurisdiction to legislate in 
relation to the area in which the legislature that enacted the adopted 
legislation has legislated. Put another way, the legislation being adopted 
has to be legislation that the adopting legislature has the independent 
power to enact. So for Parliament to be able to adopt provincial legislation 
regulating some aspect of the securities industry, the adopted legislation 
would have to be legislation that Parliament has the power to enact 
independently of the provinces. This is consistent with the Reference, 
which emphasizes that the jurisdiction of each level of government is 
distinct: “one power may not be used in a manner that effectively 
eviscerates another.”248 Each jurisdiction would contribute something 
unique to the collective administrative agency established under the 
Amended Agreement in Principle.  
B. National Systemic Risk Regulator  
 As noted, the federal government has announced its intention to 
proceed to exercise its systemic risk jurisdiction on its own, if a single or 
common regulator plan fails. In that event, systemic risk responsibilities 
could be allocated to an existing federal regulator (such as the Canadian 
banking regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI)) or a freestanding federal systemic risk regulator could 
be created (for the securities markets or generally). 
 Because systemic risk in the securities markets is intimately 
interlinked with many aspects of those markets, creating a free-standing 
federal systemic risk regulator that does not possess jurisdiction over day-
to-day securities regulation could be challenging.249  
 __________  
248  Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at paras 7, 43-46, 57-66, 83 
(S.C.C.); also Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494 at paras 22-25, 45-46 (S.C.C.). 
249 See also Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian 
Financial Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation 
After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 197. 
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 One critic of a federal systemic risk regulator argues that there is no 
need for the federal government to exercise its jurisdiction to manage 
systemic risk, given that it arises from the day-to-day operations of the 
securities markets.250 While acknowledging the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over systemic risk, Jeffrey MacIntosh proposes that systemic 
risk simply will not arise if the provincial regulators do their jobs. He says 
that “to the extent that there is a link between securities regulators and 
systemic risk, it is adequately addressed when regulators are attentive to 
their historic mandates.”251 
 Even if correct, this approach does not account for that fact that 
provincial securities regulators, concerned with their day-to-day 
operations, may not pay close attention to the accretion of multiple 
smaller risks both in their own jurisdictions and those of the other 
provinces. Provinces will naturally affect systemic risk through their day-
to-day regulation of securities markets. If they go too far, of course, they 
will be entrenching on federal jurisdiction — a question that potentially 
could become the subject of another court decision. At the same time, the 
fact that systemic risk is embedded in the day-to-day operations of the 
securities markets means that any attempt on the part of the federal 
government to manage systemic risk will have to be done in some degree 
of concert with the provinces — although not necessarily a single or 
common securities regulator.  
 The crucial question continues to be how to design the link between 
such a systemic risk regulator and the provincial Commissions, which 
remain responsible for regulating the day-to-day operations of the 
securities markets. According to the FSB, implementing quantitative 
indicators and methodologies for identifying and managing systemic risk 
“will likely require enhanced data collection”.252 Without, at a minimum, 
 __________  
250  Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “A National Securities Commission? The Headless Horseman Rides 
Again” in Anand, ed., ibid., at 223.  
251  Ibid., at 276. 
252  Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements, and the 
Secretariat of the Financial Stability Board, “Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance 
of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations”, Report to the  
G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (October 2009) at 18. The report 
discusses quantitative assessments and methodologies, including indicator-based approach-
es, network analysis, market data-based risk portfolio models, and stress testing and scenario 
analysis at 15-20. Much effort has been devoted to aspects of data collection within several 
institutions with which Canada is involved. The primary international institutions involved 
have been the Financial Stability Board (FSB), IOSCO, and the Bank for International 
Settlements; in several instances they have coordinated efforts. See, e.g., Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Commit-
tee of IOSCO, “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures” (April 2012); FSB and 
IOSCO, “Consultative Document: Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank 
Non-Insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Proposed High-Level 
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access to substantial information about the day-to-day operations of the 
securities markets, it is unlikely that a federal systemic risk regulator 
would function effectively. Even if a federal regulator had the resources 
and ability to identify risk and coordinate a response, it could be 
ineffective if it lacked the power to implement that response by 
intervening (directly or indirectly) in day-to-day securities regulation.  
 Designing a separate regulatory regime that is effective and nimble 
in managing systemic risk, while not infringing on provincial jurisdiction, 
would be challenging. One option would be to create a federal body 
comprised of provincial representatives, likely from the Commissions.253 
Alternatively, a federal regulator could be designed as a form of 
“clearinghouse”, possessing the ability to collect and analyze data 
provided by the provincial securities regulators.254 In a similar vein, John 
Laskin and Darryl Patterson have suggested that a potential model may be 
the federal Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, under which “the Bank 
of Canada and its Governor are given designation, directive, information-
collecting, audit, enforcement and other powers relating to clearing and 
settlement of payment obligations, contingent in large part on the 
existence of systemic risk”.255 
 Some observers argue that other federal entities, such as the Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) or the Bank of Canada, 
could regulate systemic risk, thus avoiding the need to create a new, free-
standing systemic risk regulator.256 The OSFI has experience managing 
systemic risk in the banking sector. It also has substantial credibility at 
present, because Canada’s banking sector survived the GFC relatively well.  
 However, the specialized mandates of institutions like the OSFI and the 
Bank of Canada may make them ill-suited to the particular task of controlling 
systemic risk in the securities context.257 These pre-existing mandates raise 
                                                                                                                        
Framework and Specific Methodologies” (January 8, 2014); Report of the Senior Supervi-
sors Group to the FSB, “Progress Report on Counterparty Data” (January 15, 2014). 
253 Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial 
Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the 
Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 218.  
254 Cristie Ford and Hardeep Gill, “A National Systemic Risk Clearinghouse?” in Anita Anand, 
ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2012) at 167-169; but, see Andrew Green, “Effectiveness, Accountability, and Bias: 
Some Concerns about a Quasi-National Securities Regulator”, in Anand, ed., ibid. (raising 
questions about accountability within a clearinghouse model). 
255  John Laskin and Darryl Patterson, “Moving Forward after the Securities Act Reference: The 
Future of Securities Regulation in Canada” (2012) 1 Comm. Litig. and Arb. Rev. 5 at 9.  
256 Nick Le Pan, “Look Before You Leap: A Skeptical View of Proposals to Meld Macro- and 
Microprudential Regulation” (2009) C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary No. 296. 
257 Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial 
Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the 
Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 217-218. 
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issues of institutional independence, since the need to control systemic risk 
could in some instances conflict with the other goals of these institutions.258 
Therefore, it is arguable that these institutions may be more suited to play a 
lesser role in monitoring and reducing systemic risk.259  
 Moreover, the securities markets operate in fundamentally different 
ways than the banking sector. The number of participants in the securities 
sector is far greater, and participants are more varied in nature. Thus far, 
their regulation has been disclosure-based and investor protection-oriented, 
rather than prudential. Neither the Bank of Canada nor OSFI currently has 
access to information about developments in the securities markets, or even 
much familiarity with how those markets operate and how systemic risk 
might develop within them. In their present forms they lack both the 
resource infrastructure and the expertise to discharge this task (which is not 
to say that such capacity cannot be developed). 
 Another alternative would be to establish a new, freestanding 
regulator responsible for managing systemic risk in the securities markets. 
Given the number of other regulators in the Canadian securities markets, a 
dedicated systemic risk regulator could also help ensure that that issue 
does not “get lost”.260 IOSCO in particular has been involved in 
delineating the responsibilities of securities regulators with regard to 
systemic risk. IOSCO maintains that, following the GFC, securities 
regulators in particular have an important role to play in mitigating 
systemic risk.261 The standards and methodologies being developed at the 
international level may help guide the management of systemic risk within 
Canada, and Canadian securities markets. 
 Alternatively, a new regulator could be made responsible for 
systemic risk across the Canadian capital markets — that is, in the 
 __________  
258 Anand, ed., ibid., at 218-219. 
259 Also in the federal government’s Budget 2012 it committed to implementing “a comprehen-
sive risk management framework for Canada’s systemically important banks”. Department 
of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012 (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2012) at 144 [Budget 2012]. 
260 Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in Canadian Financial 
Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the 
Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 219. 
261 Technical Committee of IOSCO, “Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities 
Regulators” (February 2011) at 8-14, 26-27. Also see IOSCO, “Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation” (June 2010) at 3, discussing “systemic risk” as an objective of securities 
regulation (and, in particular, see Principles 6, 32, 37 and 38 and, implicitly, Principles 7, 
22 and 23); Financial Stability Board and IOSCO, “Consultative Document: Assessment 
Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer Global Systemically Important  
Financial Institutions: Proposed High-Level Framework and Specific Methodologies”  
(January 8, 2014); IOSCO, Consultation Report, A Comparison and Analysis of Prudential 
Standards in the Securities Sector (March 2014) at iii. Also see The Board of IOSCO, “Risk 
Identification and Assessment Methodologies for Securities Regulators” (June 2014). 
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banking and insurance sectors as well.262 The United States has established 
a systemic risk body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, across 
institutional jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, as well, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority is responsible for the “prudential regulation and 
supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major 
investment firms”.263  
C. Federally-Constituted National Regulator  
 In the event that no single or common regulator is established, and 
the federal government remains committed to exercising its jurisdiction, it 
could once again try to establish a truly national securities regulator, 
through federal legislation alone. The scope of the Reference was limited, 
in that it considered the Proposed Act only as it was drafted, with 
provisions that essentially duplicated provincial law. Canada relied only 
on the general branch of the trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867. The decision’s narrow scope leaves some 
room for speculation about whether the Proposed Act might have survived 
 __________  
262 The Dodd-Frank Act created a similar regulator in the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
which sets capital requirements, limits leverage and restricts the trading activities of system-
ically significant firms. See Anita Anand, “After the Reference: Regulating Systemic Risk in 
Canadian Financial Markets” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities 
Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 219-220. See also Technical 
Committee of IOSCO, “Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators” (Feb-
ruary 2011) at 12 (describing steps taken in the U.S. and Europe). See online: 
<http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc>. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
with its voting members the chairs of all of the country’s federal financial institutions or 
regulators: the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the 
Comptroller of the Currency; the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection; 
the Chairmen of the SEC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the National Credit 
Union Administration; plus an “independent member with insurance expertise” appointed by 
the President. 
263 See online: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra>. The U.K. “twin peaks” model is quite 
different from the Canadian one. It would not be necessary to adopt a “twin peaks” mod-
el, which distinguishes between prudential regulation and consumer protection, in order 
to establish an overarching systemic risk regulator. Also see comments in John Laskin 
and Darryl Patterson, “Moving Forward after the Securities Act Reference: The Future of 
Securities Regulation in Canada” (2012) 1 Comm. Litig. And Arb. Rev. 5 at 9. Whether 
an existing federal regulator’s mandate is expanded or a new systemic risk regulator is 
created, there may be merit in assessing systemic risk not only on an entity basis (that is, 
banks versus non-bank financial institutions), but also on an activity basis (that is, when 
they are engaged in activity that generates potential systemic risk). The FSB has identi-
fied the benefits of using a modified entity-based model to monitor “shadow banking” 
activity in the Canadian government-insured mortgage securitization industry. Financial 
Stability Board, “Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013” at 26-29.  
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constitutional scrutiny under other heads of power, or under the 
interprovincial and international trade branch of s. 91(2).  
 Ian Lee has made a suggestion in this vein,264 which others have 
attempted to refute.265 Given the SCC’s statements regarding the spirit of 
Canadian cooperative federalism266 and the jurisdiction over day-to-day 
securities regulation belonging to the provinces, a unilateral approach to 
creating a national securities regulator that functionally replaced the 
existing Commissions, through federal legislation alone, is unlikely.267  
D. Continued Provincial Cooperation, No Federal Role  
 In the absence of a federally-involved solution — immediately or at 
all — the provinces can be expected to continue to work together to build 
on the successful NI and MI initiatives and tackle issues of coordination, 
cost, coverage and harmonization.268 In spite of its limitations, the 
Passport System has made significant progress. It would be strengthened 
by Ontario’s participation. A clear failure to establish a national, single or 
common securities regulator might incline Ontario to participate fully in 
the existing Passport System, since its support of a national securities 
regulator was one of its main reasons for not doing so.  
17.06 CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  General 
 __________  
264  Ian B. Lee, “The General Trade and Commerce Power after the Securities Reference“ 
in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012). In his view the legislation would still be “what most people 
would recognize as a garden-variety securities regulatory law” though on a national scale. 
Anand, ed., ibid., at 66. 
265  Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “A National Securities Commission? The Headless Horseman Rides 
Again” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Refer-
ence (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 261. 
266 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66 at para. 133 (S.C.C.). 
267 Also unlikely is the possibility of amending the constitution to change the federal/provincial 
balance of power in this area. But, see Philip Anisman, “The Regulation of the Securities 
Markets and the Harmonization of Provincial Laws”, in “Harmonization of Business Law in 
Canada”, Vol. 56 of the research studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Eco-
nomic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1986) at 77. 
268  Provinces will likely continue their work towards achieving increased cooperation and 
harmonization while proposals for a single or common regulator are being pursued.  
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 The prospect of unilateral federal action to create a comprehensive 
securities regulator is now slim. Gone with this prospect are some of its 
potential advantages — notably, seamless and straightforward application 
across the country (particularly important around enforcement), some 
reduced duplication, and an indisputably unified Canadian voice on the 
international stage. Proponents of a single, national regulator have argued 
that such a regulator would be more effective in protecting investors and 
fostering fair and efficient capital markets. (While this is possible, 
whether it would in fact have been the case would have depended on how 
the regulator was structured and the regime implemented.) It would 
presumably have been self-funding, like the existing Commissions, 
though there might have been costs, including transfer payments, 
associated with the transition from the provincial Commissions to a 
federal one. 
 On the other hand, likely also gone are the model’s associated 
concerns and disadvantages. Above all, this option would have raised 
concerns that regional interests were not being considered adequately, given 
policy directives and compromises and what could have been a less locally 
responsive bureaucracy. The prospect of a unified national securities 
regulator also raised concerns about the potential loss of expertise now 
residing in provincial Commission staff (again, depending on how the 
transition was implemented and the regime structured). Other concerns were 
the possibility of fundamental changes to the federal/provincial division of 
powers in ways deleterious to provincial interests; diminishing the crucial 
concept of federalism; and not embracing cooperative federalism. Canada 
would have had to pursue such a regime over the vociferous concerns of 
some provinces, particularly Québec. Canada and the provinces will also 
not bear the costs and uncertainty associated with another round of 
constitutional litigation.269  
 In considering the advantages and disadvantages of the options 
discussed earlier, we address legal aspects, administrative structure, and 
political questions. We largely refer to the eight reform criteria that Douglas 
Harris advanced in 2002.270 We also consider the potential for each to meet 
 __________  
269  This s particularly because further litigation would have been based on heads of federal 
power that, in the view of many, are less viable bases for creating a national securities regu-
lator than the general branch of the trade and commerce power relied on in the Reference. 
270 As noted above, the Harris White Paper identified eight criteria for assessing reform proposals: 
(1) Constitutional validity; (2) Stability (regulatory permanent and no room for strategic behav-
iour by participating provinces); (3) Local and regional flexibility; (4) Universality (applying as 
widely as possible across the country); (5) Accountability; (6) Determinacy; (7) Responsive-
ness; and (8) Cost effectiveness. See 17.02 Outline of Various National Securities System or 
Reform Initiatives, F. 2001 to 2006, 3. The Harris White Paper.  
 See also Edward Waitzer’s analysis of the 1994 Proposal, above at 17.02 Outline of Various 
National Securities System or Reform Initiatives, E. 1994 to 1997 Proposals, 2. Responses to 
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the goals of securities regulation, although that is difficult to assess without 
knowing how any regulatory model would be structured or implemented. 
B.  Legal Aspects: Jurisdiction, Delegation and 
Empowerment 
 One common, country-wide, cooperative federalist regulator — that 
possessed all the jurisdiction needed to manage the day-to-day activities in 
the securities markets, as well as systemic risk and data collection — 
would likely be the most efficient and least duplicative approach. This, 
however, seems unlikely.  
 A CCMR-type model could substantially resolve inter-jurisdictional 
questions as to the participating jurisdictions that delegated their authority 
to the new CCMR. Administrative inter-delegation is constitutionally 
permissible. Since all relevant powers at both levels of government would 
be delegated to the common regime, the common regulator would have 
the seamless constitutional jurisdiction to operate across the subject matter 
area. This would not, however, resolve jurisdictional questions related to 
non-participating jurisdictions, including complementary federal 
legislation that would purport to apply in non-participating jurisdictions as 
well. It also would not absolve the CCMR from having to identify the 
source of its authority if an administrative action were challenged.271 Even 
if pursued by the federal government and some provinces, the national 
scope of the requisite complementary federal legislation would likely be 
challenged by at least one non-participating province. In fact, Québec has 
already stated it will launch a constitutional challenge of the CCMR 
proposal, to the extent that it purports to apply in that province. 
                                                                                                                        
the 1994 Proposal. Waitzer’s analysis identifies important aspects of regulatory design. As 
noted above, he highlighted five objectives: (1) maximizing operational efficiency; (2) ensuring 
regulatory integrity; (3) optimizing regulatory autonomy; (4) constructing effective coordina-
tion; and (5) designing a functional transition process. These objectives are less helpful in 
assessing the present options, however, because potentially each of the options could meet 
these objectives relatively well (or relatively poorly). It is difficult to assess their relative merits 
in the abstract, since implementation will be determinative. For example, any of the three 
options could presumably increase or decrease operational efficiency: the CCMR establishes a 
unified regulator, which could offer efficiency gains (depending on how it is structured), but 
the Council of Ministers may not be more efficient with respect to agreeing on policy questions 
than the existing CSA is. The CSA itself could continue to work to improve its operational 
efficiency, with or without coordination with a national systemic risk regulator.  
271  The CCMR would need to identify whether its power came from federal or provin-
cial/territorial authority, if an administrative action were challenged: British Columbia (Milk 
Board) v. Grisnich (c.o.b. Mountainview Acres), [1995] S.C.J. No. 35, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895 
(S.C.C.).  
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 If the CCMR were to be agreed to by all provinces except, for 
example, Québec, a stable form of asymmetrical federalism between the 
CCMR and that province could perhaps be established (in some ways 
similar to Ontario’s link to the Passport System). Even then, however, the 
division of powers and the boundary-spanning nature of systemic risk 
suggest that the precise nature of federal jurisdiction vis-à-vis Québec 
would have to be adjudicated.  
 If the CCMR (or comparable system) is not pursued, the federal 
government could choose not to exercise its jurisdiction over national data 
collection and systemic risk management.272 A federal decision not to 
exercise independent jurisdiction would make jurisdictional division of 
powers questions moot unless, perhaps, the provinces acting together 
attempted to create a scheme that trenched on federal jurisdiction, and the 
federal government then chose to object.  
 If there were to be a federal systemic risk regulator but no common 
regulator, jurisdictional issues would arise between that systemic risk 
regulator and the provinces (through the Commissions) would again arise. 
While systemic risk is intrinsically connected to the day-to-day operation 
of the securities markets, federal jurisdiction could be triggered at some 
threshold level relating to the systemic importance of particular financial 
institutions, markets or instruments. Given that potential — even probable 
— overlap, disagreements or differing views could lead to challenges of a 
systemic risk regulator’s purported exercise of jurisdiction. This would 
seem likely to lead to a challenge or reference — either path would 
logically end at the SCC. 
C. Administrative Structure  
1.  Funding and Regulatory Costs 
 On some aspects of administrative structure, the CCMR273 is 
consistent with several earlier proposals. In particular, it now seems 
accepted that the CCMR would be self-funding, as the Commissions are, 
and that the participating provinces would receive some (undetermined) 
payment to compensate for the revenue streams the Commissions 
generated.  
 __________  
272  Although the result would effectively be maintenance of the status quo, it would be a change 
in that there would be knowledge that the federal government has systemic risk jurisdiction 
but was not choosing to exercise it. 
273  As in other sections discussing advantages and disadvantages, we use the proposed CCMR 
as an example of a common regulatory system. 
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 Since 1994, plans for a national or common regulator have had a 
“buyout” component — a payout to all participating provinces to 
compensate them for revenue streams they would lose because of a single 
fee structure.274 Such a buyout was seen as necessary because the federal 
government needed Ontario (as by far the largest securities province) to 
support the national system concept. Ontario was loath to lose its revenue 
from securities fees, as were the other jurisdictions. In the Harris White 
Paper, Douglas Harris proposed that any feasible proposal must include a 
buyout feature.275 The buyout plan has been heavily criticized, however, 
largely because the buyout payments were to be a debt of the new 
regulator.276 It is uncertain whether the federal government would plan to 
cover any such buyout cost now or would still plan to recoup it through 
higher fees charged by a new regulator to market participants.  
 If a common securities regulator must pay this debt to the provinces 
off over many years by charging fees above market value, this would 
dampen market efficiency. One rationale for a common system is to 
attract and retain domestic and foreign issuers by reducing their costs of 
dealing with multiple regulators. Much of that improvement could be lost 
if buyout payments were made a debt of the common securities regulator.  
 A self-funding single or common regulator would be able to establish 
a comprehensive fee structure (for all participating jurisdictions), thus 
addressing the issue of multiple fees paid to different Commissions. 
However, that single fee structure would need to fund all of the regulatory 
offices and staff in all participating jurisdictions. For example, the CCRM 
proposal would see a regulatory office in each participating jurisdiction 
 __________  
274  This was an aggregate amount of $150 million, but has escalated since. More recent 
proposals have not even attempted to quantify what a potential buyout amount would be. 
275 A. Douglas Harris, White Paper: A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: 
Harmonization or Nationalization? (Toronto: CMI/CFIE, 2002) at 33 [Harris White Paper]. 
Also see the Hockin Report, recommending that the federal government negotiate direct 
compensation agreements with the provinces to compensate them for foregone revenue. 
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) at 43-
44 [Hockin Report]. But see Ed Waitzer, “Coordinated Securities Regulation: Getting to 
a More Effective Regime” (Paper presented to the Queen’s Annual Business Law Symposi-
um, November 4, 1994) (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 5371 at 5375 at 5381 (expressing surprise that 
the federal government would use a buyout approach, instead of threatening the provinces 
that the fees they now collect are essentially indirect taxation and, therefore, possibly not within 
provincial authority).  
276 For commentary on the buyout topic, see “National Unity of National Securities”, The Globe 
and Mail (June 25, 1996) (calls for the compensation proposal to be “watered down”); Peter 
Hadekel, “Prospect of National Securities Agency Raises Legitimate Fear,” The [Montreal] 
Gazette (June 15, 1996) (scheme is founded on the “ludicrous premise” that agencies such as 
the OSC have the right to overcharge); Terence Corcoran, “Unlawful Trading in OSC Shares”, 
The Globe and Mail (June 14, 1996) (suggesting that it would be improper for the federal 
government to treat securities regulation as a profit-making industry to be taken over).  
690 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
with the “staff, expertise and resources that are commensurate with the 
capital markets activity, and regulatory and enforcement demands of the 
Participating Jurisdiction”.277 A common regulator would also have 
national administrative and governance costs (such as the CCMR’s 
proposed Council of Ministers and Administrative Tribunal). Therefore, 
even a self-funding common regulator would have considerable 
operational costs and fees would not be insignificant. 
 If the federal government were to establish a free-standing federal 
systemic risk regulator (instead of pursuing a common regulator with 
systemic risk regulation included), such systemic risk regulator would not 
have access to the same day-to-day revenue streams that the Commissions 
have. Conversely, it would have substantial expenses, given its potential 
data collection obligations, its national reach, and the complex nature of 
systemic risk itself.278  
2. Market Efficiency and Regulatory Efficiency 
 Fostering fair and efficient capital markets is a key priority for 
securities regulators, as is discharging regulatory responsibilities in an 
efficient and effective manner. Fostering market efficiency and regulatory 
efficiency are two distinct, if connected, objectives. 
 With regard to market efficiency, aspects of the 1995 Efficiencies 
Report remain instructive today.279 One source of inefficiency noted by the 
Report is violations of securities regulation, both inadvertent and 
deliberate. Inadvertent violations, with consequent inefficiencies, could be 
caused by excessive compliance burdens among other things, while 
deliberate violators may be able to avoid sanctions merely by operating in 
another province.280  
 __________  
277  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle] at ss. 
2, 5.3. The Agreement also states that “each regulatory office should continue to provide the 
range of services that it does today … and the employment of current staff in that office 
would continue”. Ibid., at s. 5.3. 
278  Of course there are different potential costs — to Canadian markets and the Canadian 
economy — of not having a systemic risk regulator. 
279  Report of the Task Force on Operational Efficiencies in the Administration of Securities 
Regulation (June 19, 1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 2971 at 2972 [Efficiencies Report]. 
280  This concern has decreased somewhat through the operation of the reciprocal enforcement 
system — see Chapter 14 Enforcement, 14.06 Reciprocal Orders. 
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 Another source of inefficiency in a decentralized system, both for the 
market and for the regulatory system as a whole, is procedural variation 
across jurisdictions.281 
 A common regulator such as the proposed CCMR would not 
automatically respond to the problem of inadvertent violations caused by 
an excessive compliance burden. However, there could be some efficiency 
benefits to be gained, in terms of sanctioning deliberate violators and 
further harmonizing procedures and technical requirements.  
 Anita Anand and Peter Klein set out several criteria for evaluating 
inefficiencies in a decentralized system: (1) lack of harmonization; (2) 
duplication; (3) opportunity cost risk; and (4) uncertainty.282 Lack of 
harmonization is caused by a lack of “structural uniformity” (the 
processes of implementing securities regulation) and “substantive 
uniformity” (the substance of securities law). These give rise to other 
inefficiency problems. Duplication and delay are major contributors to 
inefficiency, particularly for smaller issuers. Uncertainty over a model for 
improving the system is problematic, as are the uncertainties caused by 
proposed innovations in different jurisdictions. “Dynamic efficiency” is 
also important, as it “seeks to ensure that a market remains efficient as it 
changes through time. This requires flexibility in a regulatory regime.”283 
Flexibility is hampered by factors such as lack of harmonization, 
duplication and uncertainty. 
 While the Passport System is a great improvement on what came 
before, it still contains some inefficiencies and inconsistencies.284 A 
common system like the CCMR could bring additional consistency for 
participating jurisdictions, in areas such as exemptions and enforcement. 
Having a single regulator could also achieve greater consistency in the use 
of discretion, which would reduce duplication and increase predictability 
and efficiency for market participants.285  
 __________  
281  This concern — well explained in the Report of the Task Force on Operational Efficien-
cies in the Administration of Securities Regulation (June 19, 1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 2971 at 
2972 [Efficiencies Report] – is no longer as much of an issue, given the tremendous strides 
of cooperation and harmonization through National Instruments, the Passport System, and 
other initiatives.  
282 These factors, and the discussion in the remainder of the paragraph is from Anita I. Anand & 
Peter Charles Klein, “Inefficiency and Path Dependency in Canada’s Securities Regulatory 
System: Towards a Reform Agenda” (2005) 42 Can. Bus. L.J. 41 at 43-51. 
283 Ibid., at 50. 
284  Ontario’s participation would be a significant step toward addressing many of the remaining 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies. 
285  To the extent that discretionary decisions would continue to be made at the local level in the 
planned multiple regional offices, this type of consistency seems unlikely to materialize. 
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 A common system as envisioned by the CCMR, with identical 
legislative requirements, would also likely be supported by a single 
adjudicative body to ensure consistency.286  
 Whether a common regulator would improve the existing approach 
in efficiency terms would depend on its structure and implementation. 
One problem is obtaining sufficient and sufficiently comprehensive 
participation from the provinces. For example, a province could condition 
its participation in a common system on preserving its autonomy over 
certain areas. If enough “participating” jurisdictions did this in enough 
areas, the resulting common system would only be an extra administrative 
layer with limited effective authority.287 This would discourage issuers and 
hurt Canada’s markets and investors. Therefore, if a common system 
proposal allows regional flexibility — as it should — there must be 
safeguards to ensure that regional autonomy does not outweigh the 
collective interest in a viable common regime.  
 The comprehensiveness and effectiveness of links between a 
common regulator and non-participating jurisdictions — or between a 
free-standing systemic risk regulator and the Commissions — would also 
affect regulatory efficiency, and Canadian jurisdictions’ ability to foster 
fair and efficient capital markets. 
3. Level of Bureaucracy 
 The bureaucratic aspects of regulatory efficiency relate to staffing 
and infrastructure. A common regulator such as the proposed CCMR 
would need to establish its own bureaucracy. The CCMR proposal 
anticipates that each participating jurisdiction would have a regulatory 
office that “should continue to provide the range of services that it does 
today with local decision making authority within national standards and 
the employment of current staff in that office would continue”.288 This is 
 __________  
286 On balance, we support the Amended Agreement in Principle’s recommendation to establish 
an independent tribunal, separate from the regulatory body itself, provided that there also 
exists a “regulatory forum” along the lines earlier contemplated by the CSTO (and identified 
in the Amended Agreement in Principle), to ensure the tribunal remains connected to the 
policy concerns of the regulatory body as a whole. In the absence of a single adjudicative 
body, a common appellate body could achieve some of the same effect.  
287 For example, in 1996, the IDA (one of IIROC’s predecessor bodies) imposed the following 
conditions on supporting a national system: there should be no residual involvement by 
participating provinces (except in limited regional matters); and there should be a commit-
ment to ensure regional and investor protection concerns do not outweigh efficiency con-
cerns (IDA, “Position Paper: Canadian Securities Commission,” April 1996). 
288 Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], s. 5.3. 
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important to maintain expertise and ensure a smooth transition to a new 
model, and also perhaps to help encourage jurisdictions to participate. 
However, it suggests that much potential role overlap across jurisdictions 
will not be resolved right away, if at all. If, as seems likely, there would 
be one or more non-participating jurisdictions, the need to integrate their 
operations with the CCMR’s would create additional bureaucratic costs.289 
It is difficult to determine if the proposed CCMR or a similar model 
would represent increased or decreased bureaucracy relative to the 
existing decentralized model. 
 Following the Reference decision, it seems unlikely there would be a 
fourteenth securities regulator in Canada (a federal regulator), although 
there may still be a fourteenth regulator if the federal government were to 
exercise its jurisdiction over systemic risk and national data collection. 
The degree of additional, unhelpful regulatory burden imposed would 
depend on the effectiveness of the integration between that regulator and a 
single regulator or among that regulator, a common regulator and non-
participating jurisdictions. Commission reactions to a federal systemic 
risk regulator could range from consent and cooperation to fundamental 
opposition, with coordination costs varying as a result.  
 If the federal systemic risk regulator had to generate its own data 
without Commission assistance, duplication and additional bureaucracy 
could be the result. On the other hand, the Reference may have generated 
an opportunity for Canada to create a unique kind of regulator, based on 
increased federal-provincial negotiation and cooperation.290 This could 
have the potential to meld local and national concerns in effective ways 
without increasing duplication or overlapping bureaucracy.  
4. Opportunity to Update and Reform Securities Regulation  
 Harmonization through National and Multilateral Instruments and 
Policies has improved Canadian securities regulation over the past several 
years. Much of the duplication, disarray, and non-standardized definitions 
of the previous era have been mitigated. While the CSA’s admirable 
harmonization efforts can and should be continued, harmonization efforts 
do not alter the fact that the system is not perfect. For example, National 
                                                                                                                        
This seems to be a commitment to retain at least a substantial portion of existing Commis-
sion staff for at least a significant period. 
289  Such costs would be greater with a greater number of non-participating jurisdictions, 
exacerbated if those non-participating jurisdictions are themselves not harmonized with each 
other. 
290 See e.g., Cristie Ford & Hardeep Gill, “A National Systemic Risk Clearinghouse?” in Anita 
Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2012) at 145.  
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Instruments result from a lengthy process (although that lengthy process 
can also sometimes lead to a better product when regional perspectives are 
canvassed). Many provinces still maintain “carve-outs” for particular 
provisions, even in National (or Multilateral) Instruments. The overall 
result has been a complex and unintuitive collection of provincial 
legislation, National or Multilateral Instruments, Policies and Forms 
(sometimes with detailed appendices concerning the scope of coverage); 
provincial instruments and carve-outs, blanket orders and, sometimes, 
additional provincial rules or regulations. The fact that the law is fractured 
across different legislative instruments makes it difficult to understand, 
and unwieldy to work with.291 Moreover, the limitations of the CSA that 
the Crawford Report identified in 2003 persist.292 
 If Canadian jurisdictions were to change the regulatory regime for 
securities, it could be an opportunity to revise, update and consolidate the 
securities laws. Any new model would ideally want to avoid U.S.-style 
pitfalls. The United States has the most complicated and highly regulated 
securities system in the world. Although the SEC regulates nationally, 
each state also has a role.293 The basic 1933 and 1934 U.S. Acts have seen 
a plethora of modifications and additions. Canada has the opportunity to 
develop a system with some of the U.S. advantages (a system with 
extensive coverage, which still maintains regional flexibility), without its 
major disadvantage (excessive complexity due to over-regulation built on 
an outdated base). However, the possibility still exists that as a pre-
condition to participation, some provinces would demand retaining 
autonomy over certain aspects of securities regulation, resulting in an 
undesirable plethora of regulation.294  
 The CCMR contemplates that each participating provincial jurisdiction 
would enact an identical provincial statute. Identical Acts would 
automatically eliminate much duplication. For example, definitions could be 
standardized across the jurisdictions and legislation could be altered to reflect 
 __________  
291 While consolidation and updating of provincial statutes has improved in recent years, this 
has also been a serious concern at times: see, e.g., Crawford Panel, A Blueprint for A New 
Model: A Discussion Paper by the Crawford Panel on A Single Canadian Securities Regula-
tor (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2005) at 16.  
292 See 17.02 Outline of Various National Securities System or Reform Initiatives, F. 2001 to 
2006, 4. Crawford Report. 
293 For more details, see Joel Seligman, “The United States Federal-State Model of Securities 
Regulation” in Wise Person’s Committee, It’s Time: Wise Person’s Committee to review the 
structure of securities regulation in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003) at 77. 
294 See John B. Laskin and Darryl C. Patterson, “Moving Forward after the Securities Act 
Reference: The Future of Securities Regulation in Canada” (2012) 1:1 Com. Litig. & Arb. 
Rev. 5 at 10. 
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technological advances.295 Any other jurisdiction that chose to participate in 
the CCMR after the initial uniform legislation was enacted in those 
jurisdictions would have less scope to influence it (except that some 
amendments may be made as part of that new jurisdiction agreeing to join). 
 If there were to be initial new securities laws under a common 
regulator such as the CCMR, the issue of updating legislation and passing 
regulations would depend on important mechanical questions. Moving to 
a more platform statute and leaving details to subordinate legislation could 
reduce the reliance on provincial legislatures, if the central regulator were 
empowered to make rules.  
 For the proposed CCMR, for example, the Amended Agreement in 
Principle contemplates that the Council of Ministers (comprising the 
federal Minister of Finance and the relevant ministers from all 
participating jurisdictions) would be the only body within the CCMR 
authorized to propose legislative amendments — and, indeed, provincial 
legislative amendments would require the Council’s approval.296 The 
Council would only request that the board consider regulatory changes, 
and approve those changes. In contrast, more fundamental changes to the 
terms of the agreement between the parties, or to the CCMR, would have 
to be approved by the Council. The degree of consent needed varies by 
subject matter.297  
 Difficulties would, of course, also continue to exist with continued 
harmonization in a decentralized system. Proponents of a more 
decentralized system have also argued that decentralized but coordinated 
regulatory systems can learn from each other, and thereby improve their 
practices, more effectively than a unified regulator.298 If the CCMR does 
not succeed, the CSA would seem to be the most pragmatic option for 
continuing to reform Canadian securities legislation as needed.  
 __________  
295 Such features can be seen in the Minister of Finance, Proposed Canadian Securities Act, 
online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm.pdf>, which would have harmonized defini-
tions across all jurisdictions (including non-participating jurisdictions) and would have 
created a system for regulating exchange-traded derivatives. The securities-related provi-
sions in the Criminal Code of Canada and even the Canada Business Corporations Act 
could also be incorporated into the complementary new federal securities legislation. 
296 Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle] at s. 
3.5.  
297  Ibid. at ss. 3.2, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. 
298  See, e.g., Jeffrey MacIntosh, “Canada’s Passport to Regulatory Competition”, National Post 
(March 18, 2004). Perhaps the best-known argument in favour of cross-jurisdictional regula-
tory competition in securities regulation is Roberta Romano, “Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation” (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 2359. 
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5. Costs and Risks Associated with Change 
 While considerable resources have been allocated to establishing first 
a national, and now a common, capital markets regulator for Canada, 
these are sunk costs that will not be recouped no matter what decisions are 
taken in future. Actually creating a CCMR will incur additional costs and 
raise new risks, and having to integrate the CCMR’s activities with non-
participating jurisdictions would present additional risks. Developing a 
national systemic risk regulator for the securities markets (a new entity or 
within an existing entity), and integrating it in some fashion with existing 
provincial securities regimes, would involve less change to the securities 
regulatory system itself (though potentially not less risk, in terms of 
integration challenges).  
 The main advantage to foregoing a common system would be 
avoiding the risk of more large-scale regulatory change. Even if a 
common, nation-wide system were unanimously considered the best route, 
it is onerous to change a complicated administrative system. For this 
reason, some argue that (partial) reform should be sought through 
increased cooperation and coordination of the existing system.299 There is 
no guarantee that a common system would be properly planned or 
implemented, in a way that avoids causing a separate set of problems. 
Provinces, policy makers, and scholars differ on whether the marginal 
benefits of a common regulatory regime outweigh the marginal benefits of 
continuing with interprovincial cooperation (with or without a federal role 
in managing systemic risk). 
6.  Criminal Jurisdiction and Regulatory Jurisdiction 
 Proponents of a common or unified system point to enhanced 
enforcement as a key potential benefit of such a system.300 There are three 
avenues for enforcement: administrative, quasi-criminal and criminal.301 
Increased harmonization or a common regulator with no federal 
 __________  
299 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “A National Securities Commission? The Headless 
Horseman Rides Again”; and Stéphane Rousseau, “The Provinces’ Competence over Secu-
rities Regulation in Canada: Taking Stock of the Supreme Court’s Opinion” in Anita 
Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2012) at 223 and 279 respectively. 
300 This would somewhat address what some consider a “Canadian market discount” arising in 
part from the disjointed nature of securities law enforcement across the country. See, e.g., 
Peter Cory & Marilyn Pilkington, Research Report prepared for the Task Force to Modern-
ize Securities Legislation, “Critical Issues in Enforcement”, Canada Steps Up (2005). 
301  Chapter 14 Enforcement, 14.04 Administrative Sanctions, 14.08 Penal (Quasi-criminal) 
Sanctions, 14.09 Criminal Code Offences.. 
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involvement could have a direct impact on the first two. A national 
regulator, a single regulator, or a common regulator with federal 
involvement could affect the third. For example, the CSTO envisioned 
stronger criminal enforcement as an advantage that would have flowed 
from implementation of the Proposed Act, which incorporated criminal 
law provisions. The office’s Transition Plan stated that “these offences are 
harmonized with the provisions for general regulatory obligations and 
regulatory offences”. The CSTO envisioned that “significant cooperation 
and coordination among police and regulatory and prosecution 
authorities” would move on the most appropriate path and in a timely 
way. It was also anticipated that the CSRA (the national regulator that 
would have been created under the Proposed Act) would have worked to 
have some Commission enforcement staff qualified to conduct securities-
related criminal investigations.302 
 Some of this may still be relevant under the current CCMR proposal. 
In particular, the federal government intends to delegate its criminal law 
power in the capital markets area to the CCMR.303 The Amended 
Agreement in Principle is silent as to what coordination and cooperation 
steps would be undertaken under the CCMR model, or what the scope 
would be of the “complementary” federal legislation, relative to what the 
Proposed Act would have tried to accomplish.304 
 __________  
302  CSTO, “Transition Plan for the Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority,” July 12, 2010 at 9. 
Note that there are potential issues when Commission staff gather information using their exten-
sive powers under securities laws, with the potential for passing that information to police or 
prosecutors for criminal-offence purposes, because the information may not have been gathered in 
accordance with Charter rights. See, for example, R. v Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 
S.C.R. 757 at para. 84 (S.C.C.) (also discussed in Chapter 4 Machinery, 4.06 Charter Issues, D. 
Section 8 (Protection from “Unreasonable Search or Seizure”)). And see Glen Jennings and Cath-
erine Weiler, “Regulatory Investigations: Applying Jarvis in the Securities Context”, online: 
<http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/PublicationPDFs/20120709_ Regulatory-
Investigations-Applying-Jarvis-in-the-Securities-Context.PDF> at 11 and 15; see also David 
Stratas, ““Crossing the Rubicon”: The Supreme Court and Regulatory Investigations” (2002) 6 
CR (6th) 74. 
303 Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], at ss. 
1.1, 2 respectively. 
304  Another type of approach could be a new, dedicated capital markets enforcement agency, 
which would incorporate what is now the jurisdiction of the Integrated Market Enforcement 
Teams under the RCMP (although this proposal is apparently not being pursued). See Poo-
nam Puri, “A Model for Common Enforcement in Canada: The Canadian Capital Markets 
Enforcement Agency and the Canadian Securities Hearing Tribunal”, Research Study pre-
pared for the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capi-
tal Markets: Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 
2009) at 10-15. Puri also argued for a new independent adjudicative tribunal for hearing 
regulatory matters, a proposal that in broad terms has been pursued by the Hockin Panel and 
subsequent initiatives. 
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7. Location of Head Office  
 A national, single or common securities regulator would need a head 
office and regional offices. The location of these offices has been a 
contentious political issue in the past. All administration for a country of 
such great size and numerous time zones cannot be in a single location. 
Therefore, the issues are: the location of the head office; the number and 
location of the regional offices; and the functions of each. With a large 
number of offices, the administrative cost savings might be nominal 
compared to the current system.  
 Previous proposals (whether proposing a national securities regulator 
or a cooperatively established common regulator) took different 
approaches to this issue. CANSEC proposed a formal head office in 
Ottawa (likely nominal), a chief executive office in Toronto, and chief 
regional offices in centres with substantial securities business. It also 
envisioned “offices with more limited functions in each of the other 
provinces as required”.305 The 1979 Proposals also anticipated regional 
offices across the country, or at least administrators in regions with a high 
workload.306 Under the 1994 Proposal, the CSC’s head office would have 
been in Toronto,307 with regional offices in British Columbia, Alberta and 
one of the Atlantic Provinces.308 Other provinces might have “local 
representation”, if justified by demand and costs.309 The WPC Report 
envisioned a central office in the National Capital Region, with several 
regional offices performing most day-to-day functions.310 The Crawford 
Common Regulator Discussion Paper proposed a larger head office role 
(at an undetermined location), with specialized regional offices where 
appropriate.311 The CSTO’s proposal under the Proposed Act would have 
 __________  
305 “CANSEC” (November 1967) O.S.C.B. at 65. 
306 Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposals for a Securities Market 
Law for Canada, 3 Vols. (Ottawa, 1979), Vol. 2 at 332. 
307 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 4401, s. 15 [1994 Proposal]. 
308 1994 Proposal, ibid., s. 21. The 1994 Proposal also outlined the services to be provided by 
regional offices, “subject to sufficient demand, expertise and cost effectiveness“: registering 
market participants (unless handled by self-regulatory organizations); handling investor 
complaints; handling regional enforcement and compliance matters; holding regional hear-
ings; granting routine exemptions from the federal legislation; clearing regionally-oriented 
prospectuses; providing information on file; providing policy input, especially on regional 
matters; and any additional services decided upon by the CSC. 1994 Proposal, ibid., s. 21 
(original emphasis). 
309 1994 Proposal, ibid., s. 23. 
310 Wise Person’s Committee, It’s Time: Wise Person’s Committee to review the structure of 
securities regulation in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003) at 58. 
311 Crawford Panel, A Blueprint for A New Model: A Discussion Paper by the Crawford Panel 
on A Single Canadian Securities Regulator (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2005). 
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been for a “geographically distributed” Canadian securities regulatory 
organization with “highly mobile” executive leadership and senior 
management teams situated in local offices across the country.312 
 Relative to earlier agreements, the Amended Agreement in Principle 
has perhaps had a simpler task as it was entered into initially between only 
two, then four, provincial jurisdictions. As noted above, the CCMR would 
establish regional offices that provide the full range of local services that 
Commissions provide today, and staff employment in those offices would 
continue. In addition, however, the Agreement locates an “effective 
executive head office” for the CCMR’s regulatory component in Toronto, 
with a “nationally integrated executive management team” and regulatory 
offices in each participating provincial jurisdiction.313   
 This arrangement is designed not to be reopened easily: “any relocation 
of geographic-specific elements and functions” under the Agreement 
constitutes a “fundamental change”, which requires the approval of the 
federal Minister of Finance and the relevant minister from each capital 
markets jurisdiction.314 While contentious, the decision to locate a head office 
in the largest financial centre in the country makes some logistical sense. 
However, it provides less comfort to other provinces that may be concerned 
about the dominance of Toronto or Ontario within a capital markets system. 
In practical terms, enforcement in particular must have a sufficient presence 
“on the ground” in regional centres. 
8. Language Concerns 
 Any federally-established securities regulator would likely have had 
to comply with the Official Languages Act. Although this is no longer a 
likely possibility, complementary federal legislation passed pursuant to 
the CCMR’s Amended Agreement in Principle would also be subject to 
that Act, as would regulations made under it — even though regulatory 
power would be exercised by the joint provincial-federal regulatory body. 
To the extent that the regulatory power the CCMR exercised derived from 
federal power, any instruments passed would have to be made in both 
official languages.315 To the extent that the CCMR’s adjudicative tribunal 
 __________  
312  CSTO, “Transition Plan for the Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority” (July 12, 2010) at 29. 
313  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], ss. 
5.3 and 5.5. 
314  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., s. 3.7. 
315  See Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), ss. 6, 7; see also ss. 10(2), (3) 
(governing federal-provincial agreements and attendant regulations), 12 (instruments di-
rected to the public). 
700 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 
carried out adjudicative functions and was established pursuant to the 
complementary federal legislation, the Act would apply to its operations 
as well.316 One scholar has suggested that compliance with the Official 
Languages Act could create problems with staffing for a common 
regulator, if there are not enough bilingual adjudicators to comply with 
that Act while maintaining adequate expertise.317 
 Since the Official Languages Act is an Act of Parliament, it does not 
apply to the provincial legislatures that would pass the securities 
regulatory components underpinning the CCMR. Nevertheless, given the 
joint delegation of powers to the CCMR, the Amended Agreement in 
Principle contemplates that the CCMR’s adjudicative tribunal would be 
able to conduct hearings in both languages.318 
 It is probably unlikely that federal involvement in the CCMR would 
require all issuer filings also to be in both English and French. Even in 
speaking of its earlier proposed national regulator, the CSTO stated that 
“no translation requirements on reporting issuers will be imposed beyond 
the requirements that exist today”.319 This seems even more likely under 
the CCMR model. If the complementary federal legislation is structured 
so as to have clearly delineated boundaries vis-à-vis the public, and so that 
the main aspects of day-to-day securities regulation are covered under 
provincial legislation (as they are required to be anyway), the scope of the 
Official Languages Act would seem not to apply to issuer disclosure 
documents. This would be beneficial for issuers which make the business 
decision not to offer securities in Québec. If they choose to do so, then 
they should have to file French documents.320 Since Québec seems likely 
 __________  
316  Ibid., at s. 3(2) (definition of “federal court”); Part III (administration of justice). 
317 Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “A National Securities Commission? The Headless Horseman Rides 
Again” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities Regulation After the Refer-
ence (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 223. MacIntosh notes that this would not be a problem if 
Québec signed on, while recognizing that this will likely never occur.  
318  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014), s. 5.5 [Amended Agreement in Princi-
ple]. The Amended Agreement in Principle is silent as to whether the regulator would operate 
in both official languages; likely it would have to, to the degree that it was exercising feder-
ally-derived powers. The CSTO’s earlier proposal, which would have established a genuine-
ly national regulator under federal jurisdiction, stated, that “[l]ocal offices will provide a 
high level of service to investors and market participants that is respectful of federal and 
provincial language laws” and that “documentation prepared by [that national regulator] for 
the public will be made available in both official languages”. CSTO, “Transition Plan for the 
Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority”, July 12, 2010 at 29 [Transition Plan]. 
319  “Transition Plan”, ibid. 
320 Issuers will weigh the size and attractiveness of the Québec market against the difficulties of 
translation. In many cases, they will still choose to distribute into Québec. Some, however, 
especially smaller and less affluent issuers, may decide not to distribute into Québec. 
 As a political matter, it is unlikely that a national, single or common securities system would 
mandate French for all documents. For a precedent, see Chapter 11 Takeover Bids, 11.04 
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not to agree to the CCMR in any event, it would not be in a position to 
exercise countervailing political pressure in favour of dual language 
disclosure documents. 
9. Transitional Challenges 
 Even if a national, single or common securities system eventually 
functioned well, that might not entirely compensate for the disastrous 
effects of a poorly planned or executed transitional strategy. Such a 
transition would cause delays, uncertainty and confusion, possibly driving 
away issuers in the short-term. To avoid imposing excessive costs on 
Canadian market participants, any transition to an integrated regime 
would have to be transparent and almost perfectly seamless.  
 In July 2010, before the Reference decision, the CSTO developed a 
comprehensive transition plan for its proposed move to a national 
securities regulator. Among other things it would have allowed provincial 
regulatory staff to find employment at the new national regulator, and 
would have created a division of Change Management and Integration to 
manage business process transition. The new regulator would have 
adopted existing National Instruments as its own regulations, and would 
have worked to resolve any non-harmonized elements. It would have put 
in place a set of “legal continuity principles” to address issues that were 
outstanding as of the effective date of the transition.321 While the CSTO’s 
plan is no longer operative, it provides a foundation for discussing the 
kinds of transition issues that would have to be addressed in a move to a 
common regulator. Another source of relevant experience could be the 
U.K.’s FSA, which transitioned to a single unified 
(securities/banking/insurance) regulator in 2000 (only to be split into two 
separately constituted regulators in April 2013).322  
 The Amended Agreement in Principle contemplates that the CCMR’s 
participating jurisdictions’ ministers would form a committee to oversee 
transition and implementation. That committee “would establish and 
supervise an implementation team which would deal with the day-to-day 
transition and implementation of the Cooperative System”, and that 
implementation team would “work collaboratively with all Participating 
                                                                                                                        
Exemptions from TOB Regulation, D. Foreign Takeover Bids (foreign issuer bid materials 
may be prepared in English only if not directed to Québec, but must be in French or French 
and English if directed to Québec).  
321 See CSTO, “Transition Plan for the Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority,” July 12, 
2010, especially at 30-53. 
322 See the discussion of the FSA in Chapter 21 Outstanding Issues, 21.02 Institutional 
Arrangements in Capital Markets Regulation. 
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Jurisdictions” and report at least monthly to the Ministers’ oversight 
committee.323 The employment of existing participating jurisdictions’ 
Commission staff would be continued.324  
D.  Political Concerns 
1. Balancing Regional and National Concerns 
 One view is that increased provincial coordination could be more 
efficient and flexible than a national regulator, and would also enhance 
regional autonomy, with a national regulator potentially creating heavy 
bureaucratic costs and sacrificing the independent and flexible nature of 
the current securities systems.325 This reasoning presupposes regional 
autonomy and the resulting flexibility are desirable in their own right, and 
that these would be better and more efficiently provided in a coordinated 
model than a national, single or common regulator model.  
 Whether regional autonomy is a desirable goal in its own right is 
connected to both policy and politics. In policy terms, a more nationally 
integrated system may better reflect the nature of modern securities 
markets. Canada’s capital markets have changed considerably in recent 
decades, and even in recent years. Trading in securities increasingly takes 
place in the secondary market, and across provincial and international 
boundaries.326 The securities market has also become complex and 
interconnected, giving rise to uniquely national (or international, but 
generally not just provincial) risks, as seen in the 2007 asset-backed 
commercial paper crisis in Canada327 or the GFC more generally. 
 __________  
323  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], s. 
6.2. 
324  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 5.3. 
325 See, for example, the response of some participants contained in the Report to the Standing 
Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce on the Transaction Costs of a Decen-
tralized System of Securities Regulation (Ottawa: April 1996), Appendix 9 at 13, 18;  
Appendix 10 at 8 [Transactions Costs Report]. For example, a national system “would be 
more ponderous, embodying the worst of current provincial regulations”; “A national system 
will only add another level of bureaucratic hurdles to the securities system. Our current 
system is efficient and very responsive. Please leave it alone!”; and “Generally, the conse-
quence of central regulation in Canada is that the system is inefficient and as does not pro-
duce good results [sic]. Instead, with multiple securities commissions, there is certain 
concurrence among the commissions which produces better efficiency”. 
326 Anita Anand, “Introduction” in Anita Anand, ed., What’s Next for Canada? Securities 
Regulation After the Reference (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 2. 
327 See Appendix B, “The ABCP Crisis in Canada: Implications for the Regulation of Financial 
Markets”. 
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A common securities regulator, empowered by and responsible for 
implementing a common legislative framework, is likely to be in the best 
position to react to these common challenges, including important policy 
concerns concerning systemic risk. 
 On the other hand, particular provincial markets have distinct 
features, and their regulators have distinct areas of expertise.328  
British Columbia, for example, is a hub for small and early stage issuers, 
particularly in the resource sector. Alberta is home to the extremely 
capital-intensive oil and gas sector, often involving junior issuers and 
start-up companies. These provinces’ respective Commissions have 
particular depths of expertise in these areas.  
 The desirability of regional autonomy and consequent system 
flexibility is also a highly charged political question. Particularly in 
Québec, the question of a common securities regulator is seen through the 
lens of the historic deal made, at the time of Confederation, between the 
provinces of what became Canada. In Alberta, the prospect of a common 
regulator — even though not a national one — is viewed with the sense 
that Alberta’s capital market is different and with a conviction that 
Alberta alone is best able to address these differences. Continued 
interprovincial cooperation has the advantage of respecting these 
provinces’ views to a degree that potentially is not possible within a 
workable common regulatory regime (that is, one without too many 
regional carve-outs). This goes beyond efficiency; rather, it involves an 
assessment of the degree to which Canadian securities markets are, or can 
become, a coherent object of regulation at a larger geographical scale.  
 The question of how to balance regional concerns and national 
regulation is not easily resolved. The CCMR anticipates general 
legislation, with details in the rules — this would mean that battles about 
regional carve-outs would be held at the level of regulation-making stage 
and in the Council of Ministers. If regional offices were not granted 
enough autonomy to respond to local concerns and to address enforcement 
issues, this would produce frustration and inefficiency. (If regional offices 
were granted too much autonomy, the potential benefits of a common 
system would be reduced or even eliminated.) 
 The CCMR would have an “effective executive head office” in 
Toronto, with Deputy Chief Regulators and executive management and 
staff in other regulatory offices. The voting structure at the Council of 
 __________  
328 See, e.g., John McCoach, “TSX Venture Exchange Value Proposition”, BCSC Capital 
Ideas, October 26, 2010, BCSCn, online: <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/news/ 
capital_ideas/John%20McCoach%20Powerpoint%20-%20Capital%20Ideas.pdf>; but, see 
Poonam Puri, “Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on Optimal Securities Regulatory 
Structure” Report prepared for the Wise Persons Committee (October 7, 2003).  
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Ministers level suggests that ultimate decision-making power would 
remain with the federal government and the major capital markets 
jurisdictions, and decisions would require a high level of consensus 
among them. As between the major capital markets jurisdictions (those 
representing at least ten per cent of the national gross domestic product 
deriving from financial services), the Amended Agreement in Principle 
treats British Columbia (and would treat Alberta or Québec, were they to 
join) on the same footing as Ontario. In addition, the language of the 
Amended Agreement in Principle explicitly references regional interests 
and the need to balance them with national objectives, although its overall 
purpose is explicitly to use “national standards reflected in cooperatively-
developed regulations consistently applied”.329 
2.  Links with Non-Participating Jurisdictions 
 Participation in a national, single or common regulator is, at its most 
basic, a political decision by the respective provincial governments — 
which is why there may never be a national or single regulator. Assuming 
that not all provincial jurisdictions choose to participate in the CCMR, 
some link or connection between them will be required, perhaps modelled 
on Ontario’s link with the other jurisdictions in the Passport System 
context. If there were a separate federal systemic risk regulator, that 
would also require a link to the Commissions. 
 The Amended Agreement in Principle says only that the CCMR “will 
use its best efforts to negotiate and implement an interface mechanism 
with each jurisdiction that is not a Participating Jurisdiction such that the 
cooperative capital markets regulatory system contemplated by this 
Agreement is, effectively, of national application.”330 The relative strength 
of the CCMR’s bargaining position would depend on how many non-
participating jurisdictions there were, but the fact that the CCMR 
represents a significant portion of Canada’s capital market activity may 
weigh in its favour. 
3. Canada’s International Voice 
 Assuming non-participating provinces or territories do not seriously 
contest a common regulator’s legitimacy at the international level, it 
 __________  
329  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], 
respectively ss. 3.3, 5.2, 5.3, 1.1. 
330  Amended Agreement in Principle, ibid., at s. 6.5. 
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would allow Canada to speak with a single voice in international fora such 
as IOSCO.331 This is explicitly contemplated in the Amended Agreement in 
Principle.332 Canada would benefit from having a regulator that could 
speak credibly for Canada in international fora. However, it seems likely 
that a common regulator with only two participating provinces (as 
currently constituting the proposed CCMR) would not have as much 
legitimacy as one with broader participation. Of course, the involvement 
of the federal government would be helpful in international financial 
conversations that also include banking, insurance, and macro-economic 
fiscal policy. If the CCMR proceeds, it is not known at this time what role 
non-participating provinces may play in international fora (broader 
participation in the CCMR would likely lead to less representation in 
international fora).333  
4. Lack of Political Will  
 The advantages of a common securities regulator diminish as fewer 
provinces are willing to take part in such a system. Before the Agreement 
in Principle was announced, with only British Columbia and Ontario 
participating, the federal government had indicated that it was only willing to 
advance a cooperative approach to creating a common securities regulator if a 
“critical mass” of provinces participated. While it is unclear which provinces 
in addition to Saskatchewan and New Brunswick may sign onto the Amended 
Agreement in Principle, neither Alberta nor Québec has done so as of this 
writing.334  
 __________  
331  At present, each of the ASC, BCSCn, OSC and Québec’s AMF are “ordinary” members of 
IOSCO. There are 124 ordinary members in total. 
332  Department of Finance, Amended Agreement in Principle to Move Towards a Cooperative 
Capital Markets Regulatory System (July 9, 2014) [Amended Agreement in Principle], ss. 
1.1, 2, 5.2, 5.3. 
333  IOSCO’s website says, that “[e]ach ordinary member of the Organization is a member of the 
Presidents Committee and has one vote at meetings of that Committee and any other Com-
mittees to which they belong. The Presidents Committee meets yearly at the annual confer-
ence.” However, “In the case of a country where the subdivisions have exclusive jurisdiction 
over securities, the regulatory bodies of the subdivisions of that country that are ordinary 
members shall have a maximum of three votes for all the subdivisions together in elections 
in meetings of the Presidents Committee, IOSCO Board, Growth and Emerging Markets 
Committee, Regional Committees, and in meetings of any other committee or on any other 
occasion where elections are held.” IOSCO, “Membership Categories and Criteria”, online: 
<http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=membership>.  
334 Québec’s longstanding opposition to a national regulatory regime is well-known. While 
there had been some suggestion that Alberta would be willing to support the delegated 
responsibility model, more recent statements made by Alberta’s Minister of Finance in 
response to the federal budget suggest otherwise. On March 27, 2013, the Minister stated 
that while Alberta was willing to discuss increased cooperation with the federal government, 
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E.  Conclusion 
 The main advantages of a common system like the proposed CCMR 
would include the potential for increased efficiency and consistency, 
decreased duplication and cost, and greater capacity to deal with issues of 
nation-wide import and impact. Nevertheless, a badly planned or 
implemented common system would have the opposite effects, with 
harmful consequences for Canadian markets and investors. Particularly if 
the common system has a low level of provincial participation, Canada’s 
regulatory regime could end up more cumbersome, less transparent, and 
less effective than a high-functioning decentralized regime (whether or 
not accompanied by a federal systemic risk regulation function).  
 A common system’s main disadvantages stem from the dangers of 
centralizing control over diverse markets and regions. Unless this 
centralization is balanced by regional interests, the current flexibility and 
responsiveness could be lost. At the level of both politics and policy, 
achieving an appropriate balance between regional autonomy and nation-
wide regulatory capacity would be a delicate undertaking.  
 Many of the disadvantages of a decentralized approach are 
essentially the converse of the advantages of a common securities 
regulator. Even given the substantial harmonization achieved thus far, 
there is a limit to the ability of increased coordination to address 
inconsistencies among the provinces.335  
 Inconsistencies become more problematic as the increasingly 
internationalized environment pressures domestic systems to be efficient and 
effective.336 Canada could manage adequately by increasing the current 
cooperative efforts among the provinces, if only the domestic markets had to 
be considered. However, international markets view (or want to view) Canada 
as a single market. Those pressures from international markets have already 
pushed Canada to improve the quality and efficiency of its securities 
regulation. While provinces concur on the general need for coordination, this 
approach becomes practically difficult when confronting more controversial 
                                                                                                                        
the prospect of a single regulator with one office is “off the table” and that Alberta would 
prefer to improve the current Passport System: Alastair Sharp, “Alberta wants securities 
regulation to stay with provinces”, Reuters Canada (March 27, 2013). The resignation of the 
Province’s Premier, Allison Redford, makes future steps unpredictable although Alberta’s 
opposition to a national regulator has continued. 
335  While some areas characterized as “inconsistencies” could be understood as “flexibilities”, 
multiple instances of duplicated roles across several provinces cannot be.  
336 See Chapter 20 International Issues. 
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areas, such as governance standards.337 Whether sufficient progress can be 
achieved through continued efforts at interprovincial coordination is a 
question on which views differ.  
 The main advantages of increased coordination and harmonization 
going forward are that transitional disruptions could be minimized and 
regional differences particularly respected. The main disadvantage is that 
cooperation may not go far enough to solve satisfactorily Canada’s current 
and future regulatory problems, including the separate problem of 
systemic risk.  
 Regardless of the ultimate resolution on the common securities 
regulator issue, the federal government has jurisdiction to manage 
systemic risk in the securities markets and to collect national data. 
Whether establishing a federal regulator with a limited mandate is the best 
available solution will depend not only on law and regulatory design 
choices, but on what is politically feasible. 
 While we cannot assume the federal government will act on its 
jurisdiction, the present government has expressed its intention to do so. 
Canada’s international commitments to help manage systemic risk 
internationally, including through securities regulation, would encourage 
such a path. If the federal government does choose to exercise its 
jurisdiction, the crucial, difficult and interesting question may be how 
exactly a federal role will be able to coordinate with the provinces’ 
jurisdiction over day-to-day securities regulation. 
17.07 CONCLUSION 
 International and domestic pressures are pushing Canada to make 
changes to its current securities regulatory system. National system 
proposals have been made at intervals for many years. The Reference has 
forced proponents of a national regulator to rethink which options are 
politically and legally feasible.  
 A national regulator established unilaterally through federal 
legislation is no longer a likely option. The Reference leaves room for the 
federal government to find other solutions to implement a system with 
national (or at least extensive) reach, but the SCC was clear that any such 
developments must be the result of cooperation with the provinces. One 
option is the delegated authority model, with the federal government and 
 __________  
337 Christopher C. Nicholls, “The Securities Reference: A Comment” in What’s Next for 
Canada? Securities Regulation After the Reference, Anita Anand, ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2012) at 299 (noting “good faith and a cooperative spirit are not always enough”).  
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willing provinces granting regulatory authority to a common capital 
markets regulator. However, it seems unlikely that a common regulator 
would have the support of all 10 provinces and three territories. Another 
alternative is to create a unique federal regulator charged with controlling 
systemic risk, while relying on the provinces to continue to coordinate 
among themselves the day-to-day operations of the securities markets. 
Given the federal government’s stated intention to exercise its jurisdiction 
to manage systemic risk and engage in national data collection, it seems 
clear that we can anticipate at least some change from the regulatory status 
quo. It also seems clear that the path ahead will not be straightforward.  
